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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett set the tone for the city’s 2010 budget deliberations at the first 
public budget hearing in mid-July, when he declared that “this budget is by far the most difficult 
that I have faced not only as mayor, but in my nearly 25 years of public service.”  
 
Of course, Mayor Barrett is far from the only big city mayor in the United States bemoaning his 
government’s fiscal predicament in the midst of one of the nation’s worst economic downturns.  
A combination of reduced tax and fee revenues and vastly diminished pension fund assets, 
recession-induced cuts in aid from higher levels of government, and increased demand for 
services has left many mayors singing a similar tune. 
 
As City of Milwaukee officials grapple with extremely difficult budget decisions this fall, it is 
important for policymakers and citizens to understand the complete context for the city’s fiscal 
challenges.  Are these challenges solely the byproduct of economic recession, or do they reflect a 
more fundamental structural imbalance that has been building over time? Can they be met with 
short-term solutions designed to “ride out the storm” until the economy recovers, or do they 
require radical fiscal and programmatic change?  
 
In order to address those questions and provide additional perspective on the city’s fiscal plight, 
the Public Policy Forum has conducted a third-party assessment of the City of Milwaukee’s 
fiscal condition.  Using the same respected fiscal monitoring system employed for a similar 
report on Milwaukee County government earlier this year, we examine fiscal trends, compare 
Milwaukee with similar-sized cities, analyze the root cause of problems and discuss potential 
solutions. 
 
What we find is a city government on the precipice of serious fiscal and programmatic disorder.  
Despite outstanding bond ratings, a comparatively well-funded pension system and healthy 
reserves, Milwaukee has exhausted the capacity of its existing revenue streams to support its 
expenditure needs.   We also find that this reality is not solely the consequence of economic 
recession, but one that has been building for more than a decade despite the efforts of city leaders 
to manage it. 
 
Key findings from our analysis of the fiscal condition of Milwaukee city government:      
  
 Milwaukee’s revenue structure presents tremendous and increasingly difficult fiscal 
challenges.  A standard benchmark of fiscal health for municipalities is having diverse 
revenue sources, including many under their direct control and tied to inflation.  Milwaukee 
has fewer such revenue sources than similar cities while its largest revenue source – state aid 
– has not increased in 12 years.  Also, unlike most cities, Milwaukee depends upon a single 
local tax to fund its operating expenditures.   As a result, property taxes are higher in 
Milwaukee even though the city generates less total revenue from local taxation than other 
cities.   
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 In recent years, Milwaukee has attempted to combat stagnant state revenue and maintain 
limited expenditure growth by increasing transfers from the Tax Stabilization Fund and 
enterprise funds and, especially, by raising user fees and charges.   This fiscal strategy does 
not have long-term viability.  There are not sufficient reserves to draw upon in perpetuity, 
and revenue from charges for services cannot grow much higher because of statutory 
limitations. 
 
 The city has experienced a sharp increase in fringe benefit expenditures, particularly in the 
area of health care for employees and retirees.  Health care costs grew by $26 million from 
2004 to 2008, accounting for 38% of the city’s $68 million total expenditure growth, and 
they are projected to grow even more rapidly in the next three years.   Pension costs, 
meanwhile, remained level during the period, but that circumstance is about to change.  The 
precipitous fall in the stock market devalued the city’s pension fund, necessitating an 
additional $37 million property tax levy contribution in 2010.  While many retirement 
benefits for existing retirees and employees cannot be modified without the consent of those 
affected, these escalating costs suggest that significant changes to the city’s fringe benefit 
structure must be contemplated as part of a larger strategy to attain long-term solvency.    
 
 Despite modest overall expenditure growth during the past five years, the city’s police and 
public works operations have grown at a rate greater than inflation.  Most departments, 
however, have not seen such funding increases.  A few departments – city development, 
health, and public libraries – accounted for 73% of the loss in non-public safety full-time 
positions (88 of the total 120 full-time positions lost since 2004).   Since public safety 
constitutes more than one-half of all city operating expenditures, it will be exceedingly 
difficult to continue to shield it from substantial cuts in the future without decimating other 
city functions.  In the end, the choice may come down to police or potholes. 
 
 From 2004 to 2008, debt service payments funded through the tax levy increased by $20 
million, or 37%.  This growth in levy-funded debt costs has been a source of concern to the 
city, but there is no easy solution.  Capital assets, particularly local streets, are not in good 
condition and their repair and restoration will require a substantial investment.  Yet, such an 
investment could cause the city’s debt load to add to the already excessive pressures on the 
operating budget. 
 
 In evaluating the city’s long-term fiscal solvency and looking beyond 2010, we find that cost 
pressures are escalating, highlighted by continued growth in health care and pension costs 
that are likely to greatly exceed the rate of inflation, and a major unpaid bill to restore the 
condition of the city’s local streets.   Reining in these expenditures represents a major fiscal 
challenge.   Yet, even if the city can somehow hold overall expenditures at the level of 
inflation, revenues are not likely to rise by that amount.  Expenditures and revenues will 
remain structurally out of balance.  
 
Our analysis indicates that by most any standard, the City of Milwaukee is financially well run 
and management is not the cause of its fiscal problems.  That finding amplifies even further the 
conclusion that Milwaukee’s deteriorating fiscal condition cannot be reversed through better 
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management, but instead requires major policy change, potentially including an entirely new 
revenue structure.   
 
This report is intended to sound a wake-up call to local and state policymakers and establish a 
platform for subsequent policy discussion and action.  Far too often, governments on the 
precipice of major fiscal disorder settle on short-term solutions – such as depletion of reserves, 
deferral of maintenance, and inappropriate use of one-time revenues – that worsen structural 
problems and make inevitable tough decisions even more difficult.  Whatever actions are decided 
upon must be of the size and scope needed to truly address the city’s fiscal challenges, and must 
involve the active participation of both state and city leaders.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This report presents an analysis of the fiscal condition of the City of Milwaukee government, 
applying a professional financial evaluation system of the International City/County 
Management Association (ICMA).  The city conducted this type of analysis internally during the 
1990s, but it has done nothing similar this decade.  In March 2009, the Forum released an 
evaluation of the finances of Milwaukee County also using the ICMA methodology. 
 
Milwaukee’s city government currently is experiencing serious financial difficulties.   The 
recession hit Milwaukee hard, as it has the region and state, and the negative impact on 
Milwaukee’s businesses and property values has had financial repercussions on city coffers.  In 
addition, the massive decline in stock prices has devalued pension investments. While ranked the 
second most secure public pension fund in the nation prior to the economic downturn, 
Milwaukee’s pension fund now has an unfunded liability of more than $700 million.   
 
These financial challenges will require major changes to the city’s 2010 and 2011 budgets, and 
likely beyond.  How Milwaukee responds will reflect not only the inherent nature of the fiscal 
problems, but the city’s interpretation of them.  Two starkly different readings now receive 
prominence in public discussion.  The first is that the city’s problems are an abnormality caused 
by the national economic crisis, and that these problems will largely dissipate with the return of 
calmer economic waters.  The second is that the recession has aggravated but is not the cause of 
the city’s current problems, which are rooted in more fundamental financial deficiencies.   
 
Resolving that question of interpretation requires a thorough examination and assessment of the 
city’s finances.  The evaluation system of the International City/County Management 
Association is an especially appropriate basis for such an analysis.  Unlike many budgetary 
methodologies that rely upon a comparison of past trends and projected trajectories in revenues 
and expenditures, the ICMA system goes beyond budget balance to examine defining fiscal 
characteristics and structure.  ICMA’s system incorporates multiple perspectives and time 
frames.  It seeks to understand immediate fiscal pressures but also the impact of short-term 
actions on long-term prospects.  
 
ICMA created its methodology for evaluating local government finance in the early 1980s.  
Since that time, many counties and municipalities have used this system to assess their fiscal 
health.  The system rests upon broad concepts and financial data and requires the selection and 
tracking of fiscal indicators to assess the underlying forces that may affect municipal finance.  It 
focuses on four types of solvency: 
 
 Cash solvency, which refers to a government’s ability to pay its bills and meet its payroll. 
 
 Budgetary solvency, defined as “a government’s ability to generate enough revenues over 
its normal budgetary period to meet its expenditures and not incur deficits.” 
 
 Long-run solvency, which examines future costs incurred by current fiscal decisions. 
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 Service-level solvency, which is the “ability to provide services at the level and quality 
that are required for the health, safety, and welfare of the community and that its citizens 
desire.” 
 
In addition to offering an objective context with which to consider the overall financial condition 
of Milwaukee city government, this report provides in-depth analysis of familiar issues that 
significantly impact that condition.  For example, as is well known, the state’s shared revenue 
payment to Milwaukee has not grown for more than a decade.  The report not only documents 
this trend, but also shows how other revenues have increased to replace state funds and assesses 
the feasibility of such resources continuing to fill this gap in the future.   Likewise, the report 
considers the consequences and implications of current expenditure patterns, and adds an 
additional layer of analysis by examining how Milwaukee’s expenditure patterns compare to 
those of other cities. 
 
The overriding objective of this report is to promote an enhanced understanding of the causes 
and depth of the city’s fiscal challenges so that potential responses can be debated from a 
commonly agreed upon and factual frame of reference.  While such an understanding will not 
make the difficult decisions that are required any easier, it at least will ensure that policymakers 
focus on developing solutions, as opposed to arguing about the nature and scope of the problem.        
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
In order to provide a thorough and objective assessment of the City of Milwaukee’s fiscal 
condition, this report relies heavily on the ICMA’s Financial Trend Monitoring System, the 
purpose of which is to: 
 
 Examine local government financial condition—the forces that affect it and the 
obstacles to measuring it 
 Identify existing and emerging financial problems 
 Develop remedies for these problems 
 
ICMA offers the kind of evaluation that rarely is possible during time-sensitive budget 
deliberations.  The analysis strives for comprehensiveness and sophistication, seeking to take the 
temperature of a government’s finances by examining essential fiscal forces.  The ICMA system 
helps a government better understand the nature of its revenues and expenditures, as well as its 
long-term and current budget solvency.  It also examines the government’s cash position and 
how revenues and expenditures influence service levels.   
 
The heart of the ICMA system is the selection of a group of indicators critical to local 
circumstances and the collection of information relevant to those indicators.  The analysis tracks 
trend results for the selected indicators over a five-year period. 
 
ICMA does not provide a formula for interpreting the gathered information.  Rather, the format 
organizes and presents data, and provides a context by which to reach considered opinion.  As 
the ICMA handbook says: 
 
 Evaluating a jurisdiction’s financial condition is a complex process…Not only are 
there large numbers of factors to evaluate, but many of them are also difficult to 
isolate and quantify.  Relationships between the factors add to the complexity.  
Some are more important than others, but often this cannot be determined until 
all the factors have been assembled…No single indicator is conclusive. 
 
This City of Milwaukee analysis, as the ICMA system intends, is broad ranging with indicators 
specifically selected to address all four forms of solvency cited in the introduction to this report.  
Indicators on fiscal liquidity and fund balances demonstrate cash solvency.  Indicators on 
retirement, debt, and the condition of city assets shed light on long-term solvency.  Indicators on 
revenues and expenditures reveal underlying factors that affect budget and service solvency.  
Environmental indicators explore the broader forces influencing fiscal health.  Trends are tracked 
from 2004 to 2008 and, on critical issues, the report examines more recent budgeted data. 
 
In addition to using the ICMA indicators as a primary evaluative tool, this report utilizes a 
multitude of related data to create a context and an analytical framework that complements 
indicator information.  City of Milwaukee financial reports and records, budget documents, and 
select studies were the major data sources consulted.  This information was provided by officials 
from the city’s budget office, comptroller, and other city offices who were gracious and helpful 
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despite a demanding workload.  The report also draws upon demographic, economic, social, and 
housing data from the U.S. Census, crime data from the FBI, housing and fire-related data from 
the National Fire Data Center, municipal finance data from the U.S. Census of Governments, and 
data on fire and police department expenditures from ICMA.  Secondary sources also were 
consulted and the Consumer Price Index was used to assess the impact of inflation.  To augment 
the analysis, conversations were held with professional staff from the Government Finance 
Officers Association (GFOA). 
 
Finally, for comparative purposes, the study gathered information about cities roughly similar to 
Milwaukee.   Cities used in these comparisons typically were those with a population in excess 
of 300,000 that serve as a center of a metro area and that have operating budgets of comparable 
size and scope and readily available financial information.  On many topics, the same benchmark 
group is used.  In other instances, different cities are compared in order to take advantage of 
databases, such as the ICMA file on police and fire department expenditures, that have limited 
municipal participation.  City-to-city comparisons must be used judiciously given differences in 
governmental and financial structures and environmental influences. 
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MILWAUKEE’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CITY’S FINANCIAL HEALTH 
 
Analyzing the environment with the ICMA system   
 
A local government’s environment profoundly affects and shapes its fiscal condition.  While the 
ICMA system and this report focus on fiscal matters, other factors can have a major influence 
upon fiscal health.  ICMA lists an array of environmental indicators that an analysis may choose 
to incorporate, including changes in community needs and wealth, economic and demographic 
conditions, disaster risk, and the nature of existing political structures and relationships.  These 
“external” factors can affect citizens’ needs and demands for government services and programs, 
as well as the ability of a government to pay its bills, sustain programs, and maintain long-term 
solvency.  Under the ICMA system, the ultimate purpose of an environmental analysis is to 
assess whether “environmental factors provide enough resources to pay for the demands they 
make.”   
  
Summary of environmental findings  
 
Milwaukee has suffered the same economic woes—the loss of heavy industry, jobs, and 
population—that have plagued the Midwest as a whole for more than a quarter century and that 
have burdened municipal government finance.  Yet, this familiar story misses much of 
importance about Milwaukee, as well as its comparative fiscal position.   
 
In some ways, the city has suffered more than most; but in other ways, Milwaukee still is a 
financial power.   Our analysis shows that Milwaukee enjoys only modest community property 
wealth and income when compared to similar cities.  Also, underlying social problems, such as 
poverty and crime, place strong demands on city services.   Nevertheless, despite such 
formidable obstacles, the city has become more economically diverse and stable, and a 40-year 
population decline has halted.  Milwaukee remains the financial, trade, tourist, entertainment, 
and cultural hub of the state’s largest metro area.   Its central position in the region means that 
there are many influential stakeholders invested in the city’s success and that the city is more 
integral to its region than many other Midwestern cities.         
  
Analysis 
  
One measure of a city’s financial power and well-being is the size of its population and the 
direction of population change.  Most cities have substantial fixed costs for infrastructure and 
government operations.  Consequently, a city whose population is gradually expanding can use a 
greater share of a growing base of tax revenue for qualitative and programmatic improvements 
than can a city without such growth.  Conversely, a city with a shrinking population must spread 
fixed costs among fewer people, which places greater pressure on ongoing programs.  Population 
decline also makes it more difficult to undertake and afford new initiatives. 
 
Milwaukee’s population reached its high in 1960 at 741,324.  The population declined 
precipitously in the next two decades to 636,212 in 1980 and more gradually to 596,976 in 2000.  
The city’s population drop was part of a broad Midwestern phenomenon that saw large cities 
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experience population declines, often of a dramatic nature.   For instance, from 1990 to 2000, 
Milwaukee fell from the 16th to the 19th largest city in the U.S, while Cleveland fell from 18th to 
33rd and Pittsburgh from 30th to 52nd.  Columbus was the only city in the Midwest among the 
largest 100 U.S. cities to see its national population rank rise during these years.   Despite this 
40-year swoon, Milwaukee’s population has stabilized and even begun to increase during the 
past decade.   In 2000, Milwaukee’s population was 596,976. The most recent U.S. Census count 
in 2008 stood at 604,477.  
 
Another critical aspect of municipal fiscal health is the overall vitality and viability of the local 
economy.   When the economy is strong, the fiscal position of the local government is likely to 
be good.  Of course, the opposite also is the case.  In Milwaukee, the decreasing competitiveness 
of American manufacturing has led to factory closings and job loss.  Yet, many Milwaukee firms 
are keeping their heads above water through product specialization and more aggressive 
exporting.  Because of such adaptations and other changes, national bond rating agencies are 
upbeat about the region’s economy.   In January 2009, for instance, Moody’s concluded that 
Milwaukee’s economy, despite the recent recession, was “relatively stable, largely due to 
additional diversity of the financial, governmental, and health care concerns that provide 
employment opportunities in the tax base.”  Standard and Poor’s also noted that unlike some 
Midwestern cities where a few industries dominate, “Milwaukee’s tax base is diverse with the 10 
leading taxpayers accounting for just 4% of total assessed valuation.” 
 
Table 1: Trends in Select Environmental Indicators, City of Milwaukee, 2003 to 2007 
Year 
Median household 
income 
Taxable  
value* 
Percent in 
poverty 
Civilian labor 
force 
2003 $32,293  $20,298  22.1% 284,810 
2004 $31,231  $21,730  26.0% 282,027 
2005 $32,666  $23,491  24.9% 265,550 
2006 $33,990  $26,256  26.2% 279,409 
2007 $35,282  $30,227  24.4% 284,557 
5-yr difference $2,989  $9,929  n/a -253 
5-yr % change 9.3% 48.9% n/a -0.1% 
* Equalized value, in millions 
Source:  Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs), 2003 to 2007, and U.S. Census, American Community  
Survey, 2003 to 2007 
 
While the structure of the local economy may be sound, the environment in which Milwaukee 
operates nevertheless is challenging.  An important environmental indicator is the level of 
poverty, which does not translate directly into municipal services, but which does give a rough 
approximation of the need for public safety, social, and health services.   By any measure, the 
city’s poverty rate of 24% is exceptionally high. In 2007, this rate compared with the state 
average of 11% and placed Milwaukee among the cities in the nation with the most poverty.  As 
shown in Table 1, this rate has wavered slightly during the past five years but generally has not 
improved.    
 
In regard to financial capacity, Milwaukee’s ability to meet its residents’ needs is handicapped 
by the city’s low median household income, about three quarters of the state average.  As Table 
1 indicates, income levels also have increased slowly.  On the positive side, Milwaukee’s 
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property values increased by 49% in real dollars from 2003 to 2007, a rise labeled “particularly 
robust” by Fitch’s Ratings.  Yet, the recession has put an end to the boom in property values and 
little growth is anticipated for the next few years.   
 
Perhaps the best way to comprehend how Milwaukee’s environmental challenges impact the 
fiscal stability of its city government is to compare its environment with similar cities in the 
Midwest and elsewhere.  Table 2 provides such a perspective of financial capacity and Table 3 
looks at indicators that speak to financial demand for city government services.    
 
Table 2: Environmental Indicators Related to Financial Capacity,  
City of Milwaukee and Comparable Cities, 2007 
City 
Median 
household 
income 
Mean 
household 
income 
Per capita 
property value 
Charlotte $52,690 $75,847 $68,204 
Cincinnati $31,916 $49,338 $15,780 
Cleveland $27,007 $36,352 $20,739 
Columbus $42,031 $52,492 $45,427 
Milwaukee $35,282 $45,016 $30,227 
Minneapolis $44,423 $65,228 $39,943 
Oklahoma City $41,899 $60,268 $30,609 
Pittsburgh $32,344 $48,510 $21,084 
Portland $47,143 $63,883 $34,521 
Sacramento $49,849 $65,306 $37,183 
Toledo $35,216 $43,569 $13,571 
Milwaukee rank* 7 9 7 
* Ranked in descending order of financial capacity, for example, the city with the highest  
median household income is ranked 1st 
Source:  U.S. Census, American Community Survey, 2007; and CAFRs, 2007 
 
As the two tables make clear, the City of Milwaukee compares unfavorably with its peers, a 
group that includes a few of the most hard-pressed cities in the nation.   In fact, Milwaukee ranks 
no higher than seventh on the three measures of fiscal capacity.  On the broad array of demand 
indicators, Milwaukee is consistently near the top, meaning that city hall must govern in the face 
of higher levels of social distress and need.  Much could be said about these results.  For the 
purpose of this fiscal condition analysis, however, it might be sufficient to conclude that 
increasing local taxes and fees and cutting programs in response to budget difficulties may be a 
more difficult proposition in Milwaukee than in other comparable cities. 
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Table 3: Environmental Indicators Related to Financial Demand,  
City of Milwaukee and Comparable Cities, 2007 
      Crimes per 10,000 Housing** 
City 
Annual 
unemployment 
rate 
Percent in 
poverty 
Less than 
H.S. 
diploma Violent Property 
Units per 
10,000  
% owner 
occupied
Built 
prior to 
1950 
Charlotte 5.5% 12.4% 11.3% 108 766 4,578 59.7% 6.5% 
Cincinnati n/a 23.5% 19.2% 108 616 4,921 43.0% 55.0% 
Cleveland 8.5% 29.5% 25.8% 147 617 4,926 46.7% 68.3% 
Columbus 5.5% 21.0% 13.9% 84 689 4,846 51.9% 20.7% 
Milwaukee 6.6% 24.4% 20.4% 133 634 4,118 47.9% 51.8% 
Minneapolis 5.1% 20.4% 12.8% 147 594 4,608 52.7% 58.8% 
Oklahoma City 3.8% 16.2% 15.8% 84 585 4,630 61.7% 17.8% 
Pittsburgh n/a 21.0% 13.5% 111 447 5,128 53.8% 63.8% 
Portland 5.7% 15.1% 11.2% 68 576 4,623 57.4% 45.0% 
Sacramento 8.5% 14.3% 19.3% 112 533 4,123 52.4% 20.7% 
Toledo NA 22.6% 16.0% 123 671 4,710 60.0% 47.4% 
Milwaukee rank* 3 2 2 3 4 1 3 5 
* Ranked in descending order of distress or fiscal demand; for example, the city with the highest poverty rate is ranked 1st.   
** For housing, a higher incidence of home ownership relates to lower financial demand. A lower incidence of units per 10,000 
people reflects higher population density but also fewer units per capita to maintain. 
Source: U.S. Census (2000 and 2007), and Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Rates in 50 Largest Cities, 
2008 
 
The above statistics on community fiscal capacity and demand are not the full story.   What they 
miss is that many environmental influences lie outside the city line.   As the bond rating agencies 
emphasize, Milwaukee serves as a regional hub.  Many residents live in its suburbs but work and 
play in the city.   In the past quarter century or so, metro areas have evolved substantial “edge 
cities” whose services and facilities rival or displace those of the center city.  This demographic 
transformation has not really occurred in Milwaukee, which still serves economically as the 
center of finance, trade, and tourism.  The city also is home to the region’s major cultural and 
entertainment attractions.  Compared with similar cities, Milwaukee retains a larger share of its 
metro area’s population and payroll, as Table 4 shows.  Financially troubled cities such as 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh have a smaller share of their metro area’s human and 
economic resources. 
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Table 4: City Population and Payroll as a Percent of Metro Area,  
Milwaukee and Comparable Cities 
City 
Annual payroll  
(in thousands) 
2008  
population 
Charlotte, City $17,993,115  687,456 
Charlotte, Metro $27,056,797  1,701,799 
City % of Metro 66.5% 40.4% 
Cincinnati, City $9,918,023  333,336 
Cincinnati, Metro $31,022,098  2,155,137 
City % of Metro 32.0% 15.5% 
Cleveland, City $9,932,234  433,748 
Cleveland, Metro $32,986,496  2,088,291 
City % of Metro 30.1% 20.8% 
Columbus, City $14,460,148  754,885 
Columbus, Metro $26,470,826  1,773,120 
City % of Metro 54.6% 42.6% 
Milwaukee, City $11,388,632  604,477 
Milwaukee, Metro $27,989,731  1,549,308 
City % of Metro 40.7% 39.0% 
Minneapolis, City $12,244,970  382,605 
Minneapolis, Metro $61,553,264  3,229,878 
City % of Metro 19.9% 11.8% 
Oklahoma City $8,375,805  551,789 
Oklahoma City, Metro $11,788,272  1,206,142 
City % of Metro 71.1% 45.7% 
Pittsburgh, City $11,844,191  310,037 
Pittsburgh, Metro $33,233,092  2,351,192 
City % of Metro 35.6% 13.2% 
Portland, City $11,844,191  557,706 
Portland, Metro $30,398,305  2,207,462 
City % of Metro 39.0% 25.3% 
Sacramento, City $5,950,322  463,794 
Sacramento, Metro $21,469,100  2,109,832 
City % of Metro 27.7% 22.0% 
Toledo, City $4,505,719  293,501 
Toledo Metro $9,106,150  649,104 
City % of Metro 49.5% 45.2% 
Milwaukee rank* 5 5 
* Ranked in descending order; for example, the city with the largest share of its metro population is ranked 1st. 
Source:  U.S. Census, Survey of Business Owners, 2002, and U.S. Census, American Community Survey, 2007 
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BUDGETARY SOLVENCY:  REVENUES 
 
Analyzing revenues with the ICMA system  
  
A key feature of any fiscal assessment is whether revenues are increasing at a rate sufficient to 
sustain existing levels of services and program operations.  The ICMA handbook states that 
“under ideal conditions, revenues would grow at a rate equal to or greater than the combined 
effects of inflation and expenditure.”    
  
Since local governments rely upon multiple revenue sources, ICMA emphasizes that solvency 
may reflect decisions not just about whether or how much to increase taxes and fees, but also 
about the nature and relative proportion of revenue streams.  Whether a government relies 
mainly upon the property tax or the sales or income tax, or de-emphasizes local taxes in favor of 
fees or external state support, can make all the difference in its fiscal circumstances.   
 
The ICMA system, therefore, encourages close examination of a government’s revenue 
characteristics and highlights the importance of revenue flexibility and dependability.  In the 
organization’s professional judgment, a local government’s fiscal condition is strongest when it 
has diverse revenue sources that are not overly dependent upon external factors, when a 
significant portion of its revenues vary with the rate of inflation, and when its revenues are 
flexible and free from spending limitations.           
  
Summary of revenue findings  
  
After comparing Milwaukee’s revenue picture with cities throughout the nation, as well as 
similar large cities, we find that Milwaukee relies much more than most upon a limited number 
of revenue sources for operational support, namely the property tax and state aids.   Local taxes 
represent a smaller proportion of Milwaukee’s operating budget than they do in many other 
cities.  However, its property taxes are higher since the city depends almost entirely upon that 
single local tax.  Other similar cities often draw upon multiple tax sources (such as sales, income, 
and business taxes) in addition to the property tax.   
 
The most significant revenue trend has been the lack of growth in state shared revenue, the city’s 
largest revenue source.   Whereas ICMA emphasizes maintaining revenues at the rate of 
inflation, the city is highly dependent upon state resources that have shown limited to no growth.  
Such revenue limitations are inconsistent with escalating expenditure pressures in areas such as 
health care and retirement.    
 
Has the city’s budget reached a breaking point?  An examination of the city’s revenue trends and 
options makes it easier to say “yes” to this question than ever before. The city’s prospects are not 
good if it hopes to continue to balance its budget by increasing user fees and tapping into 
reserves.  In recent years, charges for services have grown at an escalated rate.  However, state 
regulations prevent municipalities from charging more than the actual cost of providing most 
services, and this limitation will confine the future growth of this resource.  A diminished Tax 
Stabilization Fund (TSF) and a drop-off in other income caused by the current recession further 
complicate the revenue picture.  Major revenue restructuring appears necessary. 
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Analysis 
 
Major revenue sources 
 
Table 5 presents Milwaukee’s eight major sources of operating revenues.  Each of those major 
revenue sources is then described, with inclusion of the most recent fiscal data in each 
description. 
 
Table 5: Major Milwaukee Operating Revenues, 2008 (in millions) 
Revenue 2008 
% of 
total 
Intergovernmental $271,100  44.1% 
Property Taxes $141,573  23.0% 
Charges for Services $86,410  14.1% 
Tax Stabilization Fund Transfer $29,457  4.8% 
Enterprise Fund Transfers $28,869  4.7% 
Contributions $21,532  3.5% 
Other $17,703  2.9% 
Licenses & Permits $12,918  2.1% 
Fines and Forfeits $5,277  0.9% 
Total $614,839  100% 
Source: City of Milwaukee, financial records, unaudited 
 
Intergovernmental Revenues are grants and aids that come from the state and, to a much smaller 
degree, the federal government.  About 85% of the city’s intergovernmental revenues ($231 
million of the $273 million in 2007) come from state “shared revenue” for general government 
expenditures.  Other major state funds include local street aids ($26 million) and expenditure 
restraint aids ($9 million).  The latter provides incentive payments to control growth in local 
expenditures.  
 
Property Taxes, under state statute, are designated as the major source of municipal tax revenue.  
The state, as modified by the 2009-11 budget, has limited property tax increases to 3% each year 
or the value of new construction.   Property taxes collected by the city are allocated to four 
government funds: the General Fund ($141 million in 2008), debt service ($74 million), capital 
projects ($7 million), and non-major funds ($5 million).1   
 
Charges for Services are revenues received for services delivered by city departments.  The state 
legislature has specified the types of services for which user fees can be assessed and has 
prohibited the establishment of fees that exceed the cost of service. Milwaukee currently has 33 
                                                 
1 Local governments also are allowed an “add-on” to the State Motor Vehicle Registration fee (the so-called wheel 
tax) that only can be used for transportation purposes, and they are authorized to levy a hotel/motel room tax of up 
to 8% (which in Milwaukee flow to the convention center district).  In 2008, Milwaukee implemented a $20 wheel 
tax that is budgeted to generate an estimated $6.6 million in 2009.    Under authorizing legislation, half of the wheel 
tax monies go to the General Fund and half to debt service to offset local street repair costs formerly paid by special 
assessments. 
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departmental service charges.  Major charges for services include the solid waste fee, the sewer 
maintenance fee and the snow and ice fee.  Charges for services totaled $86 million in 2008. 
 
Tax Stabilization Fund (TSF) is used to reduce fluctuations in the city’s property tax rate.  
Revenues in the fund are generated from unexpended appropriations and revenue surpluses.   
Each year, as part of the budget process, an amount is set aside for transfer from the TSF to the 
General Fund.  The TSF is not a contingency fund; the city has such a fund to address 
unanticipated budget shortfalls that occur during the fiscal year.  In recent years, TSF revenues 
have ranged from a low of $16 million in 2006 to a high of $29 million in 2008.      
 
Enterprise Fund Transfers are monies that are not needed for operating or capital purposes by the 
city’s “enterprises” or that reimburse costs incurred by city departments for those enterprises.  
The city has three major enterprise funds: water works, sewer maintenance, and parking.  These 
funds are entirely self-sufficient and supported by charges for services.   The parking fund 
generates a substantial transfer to the General Fund each year ($18 million in 2008).  Among the 
other fund transfers ($11 million in 2008), the water works generates the largest amount for 
payments in lieu of taxes.  
 
Licenses and Permits are revenues that accrue from charges assessed by city departments that 
grant a person legal permission to engage in a business, occupation, or other regulated activity.  
Of the $14 million generated in license and permit fee revenue in 2007, building permits ($2.8 
million), food and health licenses ($1.7 million) and street excavation-related permits ($1.3 
million) yielded the greatest revenue.  
 
Fines and Forfeitures constitute revenues received by the Municipal Court from individuals 
violating municipal laws.  The city received $6 million in such legal payments in 2007. 
 
Contributions are revenues received by the city through reimbursement or donation for various 
municipal purposes.  These revenues primarily are reimbursements from the Employee 
Retirement System for pension-related costs. 
 
Others Revenues include revenues from interest earnings and property tax-related payments.  
This category also includes rental revenues and monies from the sale of properties. 
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Distinctive revenue characteristics 
 
Tables 6 and 7 shed further light on the city’s revenues.  They show that Milwaukee, while not 
unique, has a distinctive revenue pattern in comparison with other large cities across the U.S. and 
other municipalities in the state of Wisconsin.   
 
The data in these two tables comes from the most recent U.S. Census of Governments conducted 
in 2002 and published in 2005.  The percentages in the two tables differ somewhat because the 
first table pertains to general operating revenue and the second table to all government funds 
(excluding business enterprises).  In other words, the second table includes revenues allocated to 
debt service, capital outlay, and minor government accounts.  Because the U.S. Census uses its 
own revenue definition and categorization scheme, some of the numbers, such as charges for 
services, differ from City of Milwaukee figures.  Despite these complications, the Governmental 
Census is an excellent way to get a broad picture of Milwaukee’s revenues since all cities use the 
same definitions and data collection format. The U.S. Census will issue a new report on 
municipal finances in the fall or winter of 2009 which will enable this comparative analysis to be 
updated. 
Table 6: General Revenue Sources for Municipal Governments in  
Largest U.S. Cities, Wisconsin, and Milwaukee 
Revenue Source 
U.S. cities
average* 
Wisconsin
average  Milwaukee 
Intergovernmental** 34.4% 35.0% 49.7% 
  Federal 7.6% 3.7% 8.8% 
  State 24.9% 28.2% 35.9% 
Own Sources 65.6% 65.0% 50.3% 
  Taxes 41.3% 34.2% 23.5% 
      Property Tax 16.8% 31.1% 22.3% 
      Other 24.5% 3.0% 1.3% 
  Charges for Services 24.3% 30.8% 26.8% 
* U.S. cities over 300,000 in population in 2000 U.S. Census 
** Includes amounts not shown separately 
Source: U.S. Census, Finances of Municipal and Township Governments, 2002, Vol. 4, No. 4, Table 13,  
published 2005 
 
Table 6 shows that in 2002, nearly half of Milwaukee’s operating revenue was 
intergovernmental (state or federal) in origin.  In the U.S. and Wisconsin, this source constituted 
only slightly more than one third of all operating revenue.   Milwaukee also was less dependent 
upon its own revenue sources than other city governments in both the U.S. and Wisconsin, yet it 
was more reliant upon the property tax than other large U.S. cities, largely because it had no 
other substantial local tax source.   
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Table 7 draws from comparative cities to offer additional perspective about Milwaukee’s tax 
reliance.  This data, which is culled from 2007 comprehensive annual financial reports, shows 
that Milwaukee is the only city in the group that does not have more than one major source of 
local tax revenue.  Comparisons of this sort are far from perfect.  For instance, Minneapolis’ 
budget includes sales and entertainment tax revenue from its convention center, while 
Milwaukee’s convention center is separately governed and budgeted.  Nevertheless, despite such 
discrepancies, Milwaukee clearly differs from a pattern of reliance upon multiple local taxes.   
Broad distribution of revenues is consistent with ICMA’s methodology since cities that 
spread risk across multiple revenues can better ensure resource dependability. 
 
Table 7: Major Local Tax Revenue, Milwaukee and Comparable Cities* 2007 (in millions) 
City State 
Property tax 
revenue 
Income tax 
revenue 
Retail sales  
tax revenue 
Food service and 
accommodations 
tax revenue 
Charlotte** NC $313  -- $78  $49  
Cincinnati OH $66  $319  -- $6  
Cleveland OH $69  $312  -- -- 
Columbus MO $52  $522  -- $4  
Milwaukee WI $221  -- -- -- 
Minneapolis MN $238  -- $30  $30  
Oklahoma City OK $52  -- $365  $10  
Pittsburgh*** PA $127  $57  -- $9  
Portland OR $354  -- -- $18  
Sacramento CA $145  -- $56  -- 
Toledo OH $19  $170  -- -- 
* Governmental Fund tax revenues 
**  Does not include $16 million in business privilege tax 
***  Does not include $44 million in payroll preparation and $9 million in business privilege tax  
Source:  2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report  
 
Two other revenue characteristics are noteworthy.  First, the City of Milwaukee has been able to 
manage its business enterprises so that each year some revenues revert to the city’s general 
revenue fund either in lieu of taxes (to reimburse for city services rendered) or as profit. As 
shown in Table 5, revenue transfers from the enterprise to the General Fund amounted to $29 
million in 2008, or 5% of total operating revenues.  Enterprise revenue transfers grew by $6.1 
million, or 27%, from 2004 to 2008.  Many units of local government have not been as 
successful as Milwaukee in managing their enterprise funds.  Indeed, some have experienced 
losses and have needed a periodic infusion of tax monies from their General Fund to maintain 
enterprise solvency.  
 
Second, a smaller share of Milwaukee’s tax revenue, as shown in Table 8, goes for operating 
support in Milwaukee than it does in comparable cities because Milwaukee allocates a greater 
share for debt service and capital outlay expenditures.  At this stage of the analysis, it is not 
important whether this distribution of tax revenue is fiscally appropriate.  Rather, the point is that 
in addition to generating fewer local tax dollars than most other comparable cities, Milwaukee 
also utilizes a smaller percentage of the local tax dollars it does generate to support its operations 
and programs. 
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Table 8: Allocation of Local Tax Revenues between the General Fund and Other Purposes 
Milwaukee and Comparable Cities, Governmental Funds, 2007 (in thousands)  
City 
Tax revenues to 
General Fund 
Tax revenues for 
other purposes 
Total tax 
revenues 
General Fund 
percentage 
Toledo $189,113  $0 $189,113  100.0% 
Pittsburgh $356,662  $563  $357,225  99.8% 
Cleveland $322,674  $58,364  $381,038  84.7% 
Charlotte $251,722  $61,713  $313,435  80.3% 
Columbus $443,427  $130,809  $574,236  77.2% 
Portland $264,410  $106,678  $371,088  71.3% 
Cincinnati $256,789  $135,513  $392,302  65.5% 
Milwaukee $142,564  $99,385  $241,949  58.9% 
Minneapolis* $150,886  $175,301  $326,187  46.3% 
Oklahoma City $196,559  $230,966  $427,525  46.0% 
* Includes $60 million in tax revenue for Minneapolis’s Convention Center.  If these funds are excluded 
from Minneapolis’s revenues in order to provide comparability to Milwaukee, which budgets its 
convention center separately, Minneapolis’ General Fund percentage of tax revenue rises to 56.7%. 
Source:  2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
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ICMA Fiscal Indicator 1 – Net Revenues Per Capita 
 
Why it is Important – Steady revenue is generally 
associated with stable operations and level of service, 
although total revenue changes may mask sizeable 
variations in individual revenue sources. 
 
ICMA Warning Sign – Decreasing net operating 
revenues per capita in constant dollars 
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – The City of Milwaukee 
experienced a 3.3% decrease in operating revenues per 
capita when adjusted for inflation.  Most individual 
revenue sources showed greater variation. For example,  
the major operating revenue resource –
intergovernmental revenue – declined 
by 13% in constant dollars, and  
property tax revenue declined by 4%. 
This trend seems destined to continue  
and, as such, poses a significant  
threat to the city’s fiscal health. 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census and City of Milwaukee financial records 
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Revenue trends 
 
The ICMA system relies on trend analysis.  It 
follows fiscal changes over a five-year period to 
provide a more complete perspective than can 
be obtained from a single year’s slice of data.  
ICMA’s trend indicators also serve as a 
directional guide that signals whether a 
government’s finances are stable, improving, or 
deteriorating.   To analyze the City of 
Milwaukee’s revenue picture, this analysis uses 
three indicators of fiscal health: operating 
revenues per capita in constant dollars, 
intergovernmental revenue as a percent of 
operating revenue, and local tax revenue in 
constant dollars.   
 
Table 9 offers an overview of Milwaukee’s 
operating revenues from 2004 to 2008.  
Consistent with the ICMA system, monies that 
are related to debt service and financing are 
excluded from this analysis and not considered 
operational.  The various individual revenue 
sources that appear in the table were described 
earlier in this section. 
 
As Table 9 shows, Milwaukee’s total operating 
revenues increased 10.9% from 2004 to 2008.  
Since inflation increased by 14%, the city’s 
revenues experienced a net decline in constant 
dollars, a trend mirrored in per capita operating 
revenues as seen in ICMA Indicator 1.   
 
Table 9: Milwaukee Operating Revenues, 2004 to 2008 (in thousands) 
Revenues 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 
5-yr 
difference 
5-yr % 
change 
Intergovernmental $273,865  $272,875 $272,417 $272,539 $271,100 ($2,765) -1.0% 
Property Taxes $129,120  $135,610 $141,102 $137,253 $141,573 $12,453  9.6% 
Charges for Services $60,825  $63,410 $73,528 $76,496 $86,410  $25,585  42.1% 
Tax Stabilization Fund  $16,870  $16,621 $16,328 $23,175 $29,457  $12,587  74.6% 
Enterprise Fund Transfers $22,726  $26,880 $26,761 $27,645 $28,869  $6,143  27.0% 
Contributions $22,236  $25,187 $25,807 $22,270 $21,532  ($704) -3.2% 
Other $11,671  $15,888 $22,555 $24,194 $17,703  $6,032  51.7% 
Licenses & Permits $11,530  $13,374 $13,729 $13,704 $12,918  $1,388  12.0% 
Fines and Forfeits $5,647  $5,893  $5,541  $5,800  $5,277  ($370) -6.6% 
Total $554,490  $575,738 $597,768 $603,076 $614,839 $60,349  10.9% 
Source: City of Milwaukee fiscal reports, 2004-08; *2008 figures reflect unaudited amounts. 
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The city’s operating budget, adjusted for 
inflation, shrank by $17 million in constant 
dollars during these years.  The two 
largest city revenues, intergovernmental 
and property tax revenues, which 
constitute two thirds of total operating 
revenue, fell in constant dollars by 10%.  
This loss was offset to a great extent by a 
combined 26% increase from three revenue 
sources:  charges for services, transfers 
from the TSF, and enterprise fund 
transfers.  Had these three revenues 
increased at the rate of inflation, the city’s 
budget shortfall in constant dollars would 
have amounted to $47 million from 2004 
to 2008. 
 
As shown in ICMA Indicator 2, the city’s 
intergovernmental revenue also has 
declined slightly in actual dollars.  
Furthermore, the flat funding of 
intergovernmental revenue predates this 
five-year period.  Combined state 
payments under the shared revenue and 
expenditure restraint programs, in fact, 
have not increased for 12 years.  These 
revenues totaled $238.9 million in 1996 
and $238.5 million in 2008.  During this 
time, the Consumer Price Index rose by 
37%.  Had the state payments climbed with 
the rate of inflation instead of remaining 
frozen, Milwaukee would have received 
$88 million in additional funding in 2008.    
 
This long-term trend in intergovernmental 
revenue has complicated and burdened 
Milwaukee’s budget decision making.  
With half of its operating revenue budget 
not enjoying inflationary growth, solvency 
has been more difficult to achieve.  Downward revenue pressure has caused city leaders to scrub 
departmental budgets for savings and search for new resources.  Fiscal difficulty has been 
continuous; solutions have not.  Budget remedies adopted in one year have given way to the need 
to find new remedies in the next year. 
  
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 2 – Intergovernmental Revenue as a 
Percentage of Operating Revenue 
 
Why it is Important – Milwaukee depends to a great degree 
upon intergovernmental revenue, which is derived 
overwhelmingly from state funds.  As a matter of public policy, 
the state of Wisconsin returns a higher proportion of tax 
monies to local governments than many other states. 
Governmental census statistics show that Milwaukee relies 
upon intergovernmental revenues more than similar cities and 
even other cities in Wisconsin.  
 
ICMA Warning Sign – An increasing percentage of 
intergovernmental revenue as a proportion of operating 
revenues. 
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – The city saw a drop in 
intergovernmental revenue as a percentage of gross operating 
revenue, from 49.4% in 2004 to 44.1% in 2008.  This declining  
proportion is primarily due to level funding of the state’s 
shared revenue program, which represented 85% of 
intergovernmental funds in 2008.  On its face, this trend is 
positive since the city has lessened its dependence upon 
external revenue sources.  However, given the city’s  
strong dependence on this revenue source  
and its inability to replace it with a sustainable  
alternative, lack of intergovernmental  
revenue growth will continue to be a primary  
cause of budget difficulties and represents a  
significant threat to the city’s financial health. 
 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee financial records 
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In regard to local tax revenue, ICMA 
Indicator 3 indicates that this resource grew 
by 2.7% in constant dollars from 2004 to 
2008.  While this increase shows that 
residents are providing sufficient tax revenue 
to promote budgetary solvency, this overall 
growth obscures important secondary trends.   
 
From 2004 to 2008, property tax revenue 
allocated to the General Fund increased from 
$129 million to $142 million, or 9.6%, which 
is less than the 14% increase in inflation over 
that time.  In contrast, property taxes 
allocated to other governmental funds rose 
by $16 million, or 23%, from $70 million to 
$86 million.   
 
Thus, while the city’s main revenue source, 
intergovernmental revenue, was falling in 
constant dollars, Milwaukee allocated more 
than half of the increase from its second 
largest revenue source to debt payments, 
capital outlay, and other related costs.  As 
explained below, this action reflected city 
priorities.  Nevertheless, it also constricted 
the flow of revenues to the General Fund to a 
rate less than that of inflation and increased 
the revenue pressure on operations and 
programs.    
 
Not all revenue sources shared the downward 
trend.  The sharpest increase was in charges for services, which climbed by 42% ($26 million).  
Growth in charges for service income is part of a long-standing trend and a response to other 
revenue shortfalls.  In 1995, the year before intergovernmental revenues stopped growing, 
charges for services revenues were $23 million.  By 2008, however, this resource had expanded 
by $63 million, or 274%. 
 
Growth in charges for service revenue is largely attributable to increases in existing fees and the 
creation of new fees.  The city instituted a new fee for sewer maintenance in 1998 and a fee for 
solid waste in 2001.  Those fees generated substantial additional revenues from 2004 to 2008, as 
shown in Table 10.   Some fees, such as those assessed by the harbor commission and for cable 
franchise, affect specific populations.  Many fees, however, are simply added on to the property 
tax bill, and essentially are another type of property-related payment.   
 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 3 – Local Tax Revenue in Constant $  
 
Why it is Important – Local tax revenue typically consists of 
property, sales and income taxes.  These funds are of 
fundamental importance to local governments in the 
resources they provide and in the budget control and 
flexibility they afford.  A decline in this indicator may reflect 
structural problems, such as a loss of population, a 
depressed economy, and/or decline in local property values. 
 
ICMA Warning Sign – Decline in tax revenues in constant 
dollars. 
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – Milwaukee relies upon the 
property tax as its major local tax resource.  
From 2004 to 2008, total local tax revenue  
increased by 2.7% in constant dollars.  This  
is a positive indicator of fiscal health,  
although as explained in the text, tax  
revenues for operating purposes  
experienced a decline in constant dollars  
(3.8%).  
 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee financial records 
$190,000 
$200,000 
$210,000 
$220,000 
$230,000 
$240,000 
$250,000 
$260,000 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Local Tax Revenue, in Constant Dollars 
(in thousands)
Actual Dollars
Inflation Adjusted
 City of Milwaukee’s Fiscal Condition 
Page 25 
Property owners have noticed the fiscal impact.  An analysis undertaken by the city shows that a 
house in Milwaukee valued at $133,900 in 2008 had seen its property tax rise by $115 from 2004 
to 2008.  At the same time, fees for solid waste, sewer maintenance, and snow and ice removal 
rose by a combined $97. 
 
It is important to note that charges for services do differ from property taxes in that all property 
owners, including non-profit organizations, pay for these services.  City financial staff estimate 
that about 20-25% of the revenue generated by property-related fees comes from property 
holders who are exempt from the property tax.  From one perspective, then, these charges are 
appealing as a means of reducing the amount that property taxpayers have to pay for designated 
city services by spreading such costs among all property owners, including non-profit 
organizations. On the other hand, since charges for services are uniform and not related to 
property value, charges for service are more regressive than property taxes. 
 
Table 10: City of Milwaukee Increases in Top Five Charges for Service, 2003 to 2009 
Charge 
Revenues 
2003 
Adopted budget 
2009 Difference 
% 
change 
Solid waste $14,126,784  $28,500,000  $14,373,216  101.7% 
Street sweeping and leaf collection $4,086,101  $10,097,930  $6,011,829  147.1% 
Snow and ice $2,449,171  $4,965,204  $2,516,033  102.7% 
Neighborhood services $4,000,579  $5,578,830  $1,578,251  39.5% 
Harbor commission $3,453,522  $4,795,011  $1,341,489  38.8% 
Total Top Five* $28,116,157  $53,936,975  $25,820,818  91.8% 
All Charges for Services $59,167,807  $87,154,340  $27,986,533  47.3% 
*  Fire department revenues are not included in the table because of lack of compatibility between budget years 
Source:  City of Milwaukee, Annual Budgets, 2003 to 2009 
 
Major issue: high degree of dependence upon constricted revenues 
 
Application of ICMA’s financial methodology demonstrates that Milwaukee depends more than 
most cities on a constricted number of revenue sources and that Milwaukee’s principal resource, 
intergovernmental revenue, has not kept pace with inflation for many years.  With regard to local 
taxes, Milwaukee depends upon the property tax, as directed by state statute.  This singular 
dependence has generated higher rates of property taxation while limiting operating revenue 
growth.   
 
What are Milwaukee’s options in the face of these revenue conditions and trends?  Perhaps the 
first question to ask is whether the downward trend in intergovernmental revenues and state 
shared revenue is irreversible.   
 
Shared revenue has a long history in Wisconsin, dating back to the creation of the income tax in 
1911.  At its inception, the state intended that shared revenue would reduce reliance upon the 
property tax and return tax monies to the city or county of their origin.  Under this approach, 
shared revenue became one of the major programs in the state.  However, as state government 
grew, it retained a greater share of tax revenues.  The state also modified the shared revenue 
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distribution formula, most notably in 1976 when taxation equalization payments were 
substantially curtailed. 
 
During the past two decades, the state has reviewed, restructured and reduced funding for shared 
revenues.  Increasingly, the purpose of the program itself has been brought into question.   
Should shared revenue fund the differential costs of providing municipal services in Wisconsin, 
as a 1993 Department of Revenue study advised?  Or should it provide incentives to curtail local 
government cost increases, as a 1997 study advocated?  Two major statewide commissions in the 
early part of this decade, the Kettl Commission in 2001 and the Wisconsin Task Force on State 
and Local Government in 2002, sought major program changes.  The Kettl Commission, for 
example, called for using shared revenues to establish a base level of municipal services, the so-
called “Badger Basics”.   
 
Taken together, these studies reflected profound uncertainty and disagreement about the 
fundamental rationale and goals of the shared revenue program.  Failing to achieve such 
consensus, the state suspended the payment distribution formula and reduced its funding by $90 
million in the early part of the current decade.  Since 2004, each city and county’s aid payment 
has remained relatively unchanged.  Today, the shared revenue program maintains a curious 
twilight existence:  too powerful and needed to eliminate, but too indistinct and contentious to 
further empower.  It is the fourth largest state appropriation.  However, it remains effectively 
sidelined as a vital force without a policy rationale to give it meaning and direction. 
 
Shared revenue’s loss of influence and funding also indicates that the state has other priorities.  
While state government has had its own budget problems during the past decade, a few large 
programs—school aids, medical assistance, and corrections—have received substantial budget 
support, as shown in Table 11.  Indeed, during this period, these three programs obtained more 
than $3 billion in additional funding, and their combined revenues grew by 55%.    
 
Looking to the future, the national recession and the state’s own growing economic distress further 
diminish the city’s already slim hopes for additional state aid.  The Legislative Fiscal Bureau estimates 
that state revenues will decline by $926 million (7%) in 2009 and another $399 million (3%) in 2010.  
Corporate income tax revenues are projected to fall by 26%, individual income tax revenues by 8% and 
sales tax revenues by 3% in 2009.   As a result of these revenue shortfalls, the state’s 2009-11 budget 
made significant cutbacks in expenditures and enacted a variety of tax and fee increases to meet a 
projected biennial budget deficit of more than $5 billion.  Actions directly affecting the city’s 2010 
budget include a reduction in shared revenue funding of $2.6 million and an increase in “tipping fees” 
(garbage disposal costs) of $2 million.    
Table 11: Major Wisconsin Programs Appropriations, 1999 to 2009  
(in millions)   
Program 1999 2009 Difference % change
School Aids $3,959  $5,409  $1,450  36.6% 
Medical Assistance $927  $1,978  $1,051  113.4% 
Corrections Related $634  $1,154  $520  82.0% 
Shared Revenue $1,008  $953  ($55) -5.5% 
Source:  Wisconsin, Legislative Fiscal Bureau 
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In a recent analysis of Wisconsin’s economy and the fiscal condition of state government, Moody’s 
summarized its concerns about Wisconsin’s finances:  “The state’s narrow operating margins and 
financial resources leave the state vulnerable to the continuing impact of economic decline. The lower 
revenue forecast for the next biennium strains these resources and the state’s ability to close budget 
gaps.  The state’s narrow liquidity and continued efforts to address structural budgetary issues will 
continue to be important considerations in future credit analyses.” 
 
The chances that the state will increase shared revenue payments in the near or medium-term appear, 
therefore, to be slim to non-existent.   Yet, in the final analysis, budget solvency depends on overall 
revenue changes and not a single resource, no matter how important.  As shown in the previous section, 
the city has managed its budget with flat levels of state funding for more than a decade.    
 
Can Milwaukee continue to deal successfully with stagnant or reduced state aid?  Unfortunately, its 
ability to do so appears quite limited.  First, as has been shown, because of pressing capital/debt service 
needs, state controls, and already high tax rates, the property tax has not and likely will not have the 
capacity to make up for flat shared revenue payments. Second, while Milwaukee increased transfers 
from the Tax Stabilization Fund by $13 million (75%) from 2004 to 2008, increases of this magnitude 
cannot be sustained, as shown in Table 12.    
 
Table 12: Tax Stabilization Fund Transfers and Remaining Fund Assets,  
2004 to 2008 (in thousands) 
Year Transfers to General Fund Remaining assets 
2004 $16,870  $50,479  
2005 $16,621  $62,656  
2006 $16,328  $82,090  
2007 $23,175  $62,704  
2008 $29,457  $42,418  
Source:  Milwaukee, Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, 2004 to 2008 
 
Third, for structural and other reasons, charges for services, the most vital revenue source in the 
2004 to 2008 period, cannot continue to grow as before.  Charges for services operate under the 
statutory restriction that fees cannot exceed their associated costs.  The city has increased major 
fee charges and their percentage of cost in recent years and the administration is likely to propose 
increasing fees to close to 100% of costs in the 2010 budget.  Such an action would generate 
perhaps as much as $10 million in additional fee revenue.  Increasing the solid waste fee to 100% 
of cost would raise the largest amount of revenue, approximately $5.25 million in 2010. 
Increasing the storm water charge would raise about $2.1 million.  Snow and ice removal fees 
were at about 80% of cost in 2008, but these expenditures vary with the yearly change in weather 
and are difficult to predict.  Enterprise operations, such as the water works, also can increase fee 
charges and return a greater percentage of their revenue to the General Fund. 
 
Because many charges for services are so closely associated with property taxes, public opinion 
and political considerations also affect the setting of fees.  Charges for services are not a cash 
cow, and city officials are exploring cost efficiencies and changes in fee-based service levels at 
the same time they consider increasing cost recovery through higher charges.  Increasing the 
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percentage of cost is basically a form of one-time financing.  If and when full funding of cost is 
achieved, charges for service revenue likely will grow in tandem with costs. 
Finally, further complicating the revenue picture is the current recession, a force that will have 
multiple and serious impacts upon city revenues in 2010 and beyond.  As shown, there are 
fundamental conditions shaping city revenues that go beyond cyclical changes in the economy, 
no matter how severe the downturn.  Nevertheless, it is irrefutable that the recession has and will 
have a major impact on city revenues, expenditures, and budget solvency.  The effect of the 
recession upon state government and, indirectly, upon city finances has been shown.  Another 
consequence is that equity losses in the city’s pension fund driven by the drop in the stock 
market will require a massive infusion of funds, as described later in this report.    
 
The recession also has had a negative impact on city property values and the resulting income 
that can be realized from current property tax rates.  Also, the decline in economic activity has 
reduced the fee revenue generated by business and industry. The city’s budget office projects 
that in 2010, licenses and permit revenues will drop by $1 million, fines and forfeitures by 
$300,000, and miscellaneous revenues by $3.4 million. 
  
In conclusion, the city finds itself with few options to address a situation that has been more than 
a decade in the making.  While creative efforts may prevent revenue crisis and budget insolvency 
in the short term, only a major restructuring of existing revenues and development of new 
revenue sources seem capable in the long run of maintaining incoming revenue at the level 
of inflation, a key indicator for maintaining existing levels of city services and budget 
solvency.  Consideration of a new mix of revenues should not be limited to taxes and fees, but 
also could include the sale or lease of city assets, including the city’s water utility. 
 
Earlier in this report, we cite local revenue sources used by other cities (see Table 7), and in a 
later section we detail specific revenue strategies employed by comparable cities to cope with 
recent financial disruption.  Those examples may warrant careful review, as never in the city’s 
post-World War II history has the case for fundamental change seemed more apparent. 
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BUDGETARY SOLVENCY: EXPENDITURES 
 
Analyzing expenditures with the ICMA system 
 
An analysis of fiscal stability must consider the extent to which a government’s expenditure 
patterns are consistent with its revenue-generating capacity.  The ICMA system uses indicators 
that measure expenditure growth and display how that growth follows revenue trends.  The 
ICMA indicators also demonstrate a city’s ability to manage resources over time, and can be 
used to reveal expenditure patterns that suggest long-term instability even though revenues are 
available to cover such expenditures in the short-term. 
 
The essence of the ICMA system is an in-depth examination of expenditures and how they 
contribute to budgetary solvency.  ICMA suggests, for example, that fiscal analyses look at the 
factors driving expenditure increases and their implications for a government’s overall fiscal 
condition.  The ICMA system also encourages examination of whether expenditure increases are 
tied to fixed costs or adding to levels of future costs that place long-term budgetary solvency at 
risk.     
 
Summary of expenditure findings 
 
Our analysis of city expenditures shows that overall growth has been below the rate of inflation 
from 2004 through 2008, demonstrating sound fiscal management.  A deeper examination, 
however, indicates the emergence of trends over the period that are cause for concern, and that 
are expected to worsen considerably during the next several years.   
 
One such trend is an increase in spending on fringe benefits, particularly health care for 
employees and retirees.  As those costs grew during the period and made personnel more costly, 
city officials were forced to reduce the number of filled positions.  This trend of increased 
spending on fringe benefits will become far more serious during the next few years as city 
property tax levy must be redirected to support pension costs.   
 
Another trend was the prioritization of public safety expenditures (particularly police), which 
began to erode support for other functions of city government.  About 81% of the city’s tax levy-
supported expenditure growth throughout these five years occurred in three departments: police, 
fire and public works.  These departments historically have accounted for the majority of city 
expenditures, but limited overall expenditure growth during the 2004-08 period meant that 
efforts to preserve expenditures in those areas necessitated sub-inflationary growth or cuts in 
others.  This was particularly the case for police services, which grew above inflation but did not 
have the same ability as public works to increase fees to offset expenditure needs.   
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The city’s reasonable spending growth 
has allowed it to achieve budgetary 
balance.  However, as the need to devote 
additional resources to accommodate 
rapidly rising fringe benefit costs 
increases, the ability of city officials to 
fund city services at historical levels will 
become even more challenging. 
 
Analysis 
 
Milwaukee’s overall net operating 
expenditures (total expenditures minus 
debt service and capital outlay) and net 
expenditures per capita grew by 12% 
from 2004 to 2008, as seen in ICMA 
Indicator 4. By any measure, that is 
manageable growth that falls below the 
level of inflation.  
 
There are several reasons why a 
government entity might increase its level 
of expenditures, including population 
growth and the implementation of new 
programs or services.  In the case of the 
City of Milwaukee, Table 13 shows that 
the limited expenditure growth largely 
was driven by increases in the public 
safety function and in fringe benefit costs 
(which are reflected in the General 
Government line of the table).  In fact, 
Table 13 shows that the public safety 
function accounted for more than half of 
the $67.8 million increase in city 
operating expenditures over the period.  
This trend is discussed in greater detail 
later in this section. 
 
Table 13: City of Milwaukee Net Operating Expenditures (in thousands) 
Expenditures 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 5-yr difference 5-yr % change
General Government $194,033 $197,717 $195,776 $216,213 $214,834 $20,801 10.8% 
Public Safety $231,371 $248,366 $250,672 $257,137 $266,370 $34,999 15.1% 
Public Works $89,562 $89,180 $86,482 $93,956 $103,149 $13,587 15.2% 
Health $10,724 $10,656 $10,428 $10,359 $10,118 $(606) -5.7% 
Culture & Recreation $17,822 $16,744 $17,882 $17,548 $16,782 $(1,040) -5.8% 
Conservation & Develop. $3,495 $2,767 $3,217 $3,279 $3,456 $(39) -1.1% 
Interest Expense $6,091 $8,338 $7,640 $6,568 $6,189 $98 1.6% 
Total expenditures $553,098 $573,768 $572,097 $605,060 $620,898 $67,800 12.3%
Source: City of Milwaukee fiscal reports, 2004-08; *2008 figures reflect unaudited amounts. 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 4 – Net Expenditures Per Capita 
 
Why it is Important – In a state of fiscal health, a government’s 
per capita expenditures in constant dollars should hold nearly 
level or increase slightly and should not exceed per capita 
operating revenues. A scenario in which expenditures increase 
too rapidly may cast doubt on long‐term funding sustainability.  
ICMA Warning Sign – Imbalance between expenditures and net 
operating revenues or a large increase in expenditures in 
constant dollars.  
City of Milwaukee Findings – The City of Milwaukee has seen a 
small decline in expenditures in inflation‐adjusted dollars, with 
net operating expenditures per capita decreasing by 2%.  This 
trend indicates no threat of unsustainable spending and is a 
positive indicator of fiscal health.   
 
A moderate difference exists between expenditures and 
revenues dedicated to the General Fund.  From 2004 to 2008, 
per capita operating revenues have declined by 3.3%, which is 
slightly higher than the decline in operating  
expenditures.  While this difference should  
not be cause for alarm, it does require  
monitoring, as expenditure and revenue levels 
may further diverge as a weakened economy  
and state budget difficulties restrain current  
revenue streams.  
 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee financial records; U.S. Census 
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ICMA Fiscal Indicator 5 – Employees Per Capita 
 
Why it is Important – A government’s employees per 
capita has implications for budget solvency because of 
the significant impact of personnel costs on local 
government budgets.  An increase in employees per 
capita may have long‐term growth implications and 
may indicate that the government is expanding 
operations, becoming more labor intensive, or that 
productivity is declining.  
ICMA Warning Sign – Increasing number of municipal 
employees per capita. 
City of Milwaukee Findings – The total number of 
budgeted full‐time‐equivalent  (FTE) employees has 
fallen by 2%, or 129 positions.  While this generally is 
considered a positive indicator of fiscal health, it may 
have negative implications for service quality if not 
accompanied by greater efficiencies or  
reductions in programs and services  
provided.  Also, in light of the  
preponderance of position cuts in  
three functional areas of city  
government, this is an indicator that  
requires monitoring.  
 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee financial records; U.S. Census 
10.5 
10.6 
10.7 
10.8 
10.9 
11.0 
6,900 
6,950 
7,000 
7,050 
7,100 
7,150 
7,200 
7,250 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Employees Per Capita (General Fund)
Total FTE
Per 1,000 
population
Another important fiscal indicator pertaining to 
government expenditures is the size of the 
government workforce.  As demonstrated in 
ICMA Indicator 5, Milwaukee experienced a 
decline in both full-time equivalent (FTE) 
positions and positions per capita from 2004 to 
2008.  The majority of the 129 positions 
eliminated occurred in smaller departmental 
budgets, which may have impacted their service 
provision, an issue that also is discussed in 
greater detail later in this section.   
 
Fringe benefits 
 
Before considering the impacts of public safety 
needs and the consequences for non-public safety 
departments, it is critical to understand the 
impact of fringe benefit costs on the city budget.  
Milwaukee’s expenditure data from 2004 to 2008 
shows that growth in both salaries/wages and 
fringe benefit costs were significant drivers of 
overall expenditure growth.  During this 
timeframe, salaries grew by $33 million, making 
up 49% of the total growth in operating 
expenditures, while fringe benefit expenditures 
grew by $25.8 million, accounting for 38% of 
total growth.  It is worth noting that while wage 
and salary growth lagged the 14% rate of 
inflation, growing 10% during the five-year 
timeframe, fringe benefit costs outpaced the 
inflation rate, growing 18%.   
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A five-year growth pattern in fringe 
benefits that modestly outpaces inflation 
ordinarily would not be cause for alarm 
(though the growth of fringe benefits as a 
percentage of salaries certainly would bear 
watching, as discussed in ICMA Fiscal 
Indicator 6).  Of particular concern in this 
case, however, is that the bulk of this 
growth is attributed to an increase in health 
care costs for employees and retirees (per 
Table 14 below).  While that fact is not 
surprising given the rapid rise in health 
care costs nationally and in Southeast 
Wisconsin, it is significant that the city 
has been struggling to accommodate 
growing fringe benefit costs at a time 
when its pension contribution was 
stable, a factor that will not continue 
now that the pension fund has lost value.  
 
Table 14: Health Care Costs as a 
Percentage of Overall Fringe Benefit 
Costs (in thousands) 
Year 
Health 
care costs 
Total 
fringe 
costs 
Health care 
as a % of 
overall 
fringe costs 
2004 $82,597 $144,605 57% 
2005 $94,097 $152,089 62% 
2006 $89,572 $149,711 60% 
2007 $99,791 $161,079 62% 
2008 $108,141 $170,438 63% 
Source: City of Milwaukee financial records 
 
City budget officials recently indicated that 
health care costs are projected to grow by 
$10-$11 million in 2010 and $15-$16 
million annually in each of the following 
two years based on current trends.  
 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 6 – Direct Fringe Benefits 
Why it is Important – Direct fringe benefits are comprised 
of employee health, pension, and life insurance benefits 
and represent one of the largest and fastest‐growing items 
of expenditure in the public sector.  In recent years, many 
local governments have seen increases in health care and 
pension costs far surpassing the rate of inflation, creating 
debilitating impacts on budgets and fiscal condition. 
ICMA Warning Sign – Increasing fringe benefits as a 
percentage of salaries and wages, and operating 
expenditures. 
City of Milwaukee Finding – From 2004 to 2008, direct 
fringe benefits grew by $25.8 million, or 18%.   Fringe 
benefits account for 27% of overall expenditures and 
increased as a percentage of salaries and wages from 45% 
to 48%. 
 
Rising fringe benefit costs are projected to pose a much 
more significant threat in upcoming years in light of a 
significant diminution of pension fund assets.  For the first 
time in several years, pension assets will no longer absorb 
the city’s required pension contributions in 2010, 
necessitating substantial tax levy support. In light  
of projections that this trend will continue  
for the next several years, as well as  
projections of continued growth in health 
 care costs that significantly exceeds the  
rate of inflation, this constitutes a  
significant threat to the city’s fiscal health.  
 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee financial records 
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While rising health care costs drove up fringe benefits spending in the 2004-2008 timeframe, the 
city effectively controlled pension costs, which typically are the other key driver of public sector 
fringe benefits budgets (see ICMA Indicator 7).  The City of Milwaukee is one of only two 
local governments in Wisconsin to operate its own defined benefit pension plan (Milwaukee 
County is the other), known as its Employee Retirement System (ERS).  The ERS maintained an 
over-funded position for the entire period, meaning that the value of pension fund assets 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 7 – Pension Plan Funding 
Why it is Important – Significant increases in required government contributions can place strong pressure on government 
budgets.  Because of the long‐term nature of these plans, the difficulty of estimating the value of assets and liabilities, and 
the costs involved, local governments can be tempted to underfund the annual pension payment.  
ICMA Warning Sign 
 Underfunding of a government’s annual required contribution 
 Decreasing ratio of pension plan resources to pension plan liabilities 
 Decreasing value of pension plan assets as a percentage of benefits paid 
City of Milwaukee Finding – The City of Milwaukee has maintained an overfunded pension system for the past several 
years and, therefore, has easily fulfilled its annual required contributions.  The city’s annual required employer 
contribution was a minimal $46,000 for 2004 and dropped to $0 by 2008 (meaning that the overfunded value of pension 
fund assets allowed the city to absorb the cost of annual employer contributions, requiring no levy payment from the city).  
Meanwhile, the ratio of pension fund assets to liabilities increased from 116% to 131% during the period, and the ratio of 
the value of assets to benefits paid improved from 21 to 1 in 2004 to 23 to 1 in 2008.   
 
While the pension fund’s significant overfunded status was an extremely positive indicator of fiscal health  
during the five‐year period analyzed for this report, the precipitous stock market downturn has reversed  
that situation.  Earlier this year, the funding ratio of pension fund assets to liabilities was calculated as  
90%, and the city now faces an additional projected tax levy contribution of $37 million in 2010, and an 
additional $29 million in 2011.  Realizing increases of that magnitude will serve as an immense budget  
challenge for the city, posing a significant threat to its fiscal health. 
 
Pension contributions and actual expenditures  
 Pension assets  
(in thousands) 
Fiscal 
year 
ending 
Dec. 31 
Annual required 
employer 
contribution 
Actual 
expenditure 
% of 
ARC  
Valuation 
as of Jan. 1 
Actuarial 
value of 
assets 
Actuarial 
accrued 
liability 
Funded 
ratio 
2004 46,000 46,000 100%  2004 3,909,085   3,370,923  116% 
2005 47,000 47,000 100%  2005 4,112,558   3,523,179  117% 
2006 0 0 100%  2006 4,556,371   3,706,198  123% 
2007 0 0 100%  2007 4,899,721   3,846,481  127% 
2008 0 0 100%  2008 5,192,000 3,958,061 131% 
Source: City of Milwaukee ERS actuarial reports, 2004‐08                Source: City of Milwaukee ERS actuarial reports, 2004‐08   
Pension assets (in thousands) 
Valuation 
as of Jan. 1 
Actuarial 
value of 
assets 
Benefits paid 
to retirees 
Funded 
ratio 
2004 3,909,085   189,538   21 to 1 
2005 4,112,558   195,738   21 to 1 
2006 4,556,371   205,911   22 to 1  
2007 4,899,721   216,647   23 to 1  
2008 5,192,000  229,267   23 to 1  
           Source: City of Milwaukee ERS actuarial reports, 2004‐08
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exceeded actuarially determined future liabilities.  Milwaukee’s pension system funding position 
was deemed second best in the country in 2009 when compared to 89 public pension systems by 
R.V. Kuhns and Associates, a national investment consultant, and it is one of only a few public 
pension systems that realized a heightened funding position from 2004 to 2008.  Milwaukee's 
over-funded status increased from 116% in 2004 to 131% in 2008. 
 
The overfunded status of the ERS has benefited the city budget by significantly reducing the 
city’s annual property tax levy contribution to the fund.  Not only has there not been a required 
contribution to address an unfunded liability, but the overfunded status of the fund also has 
eliminated the need for a contribution to cover the city’s annual share of the “normal cost”, i.e. 
the actuarially determined value of pension benefits earned annually by active employees.  Per 
city ordinances, this normal cost is to be split between the employer and employees.  The 
overfunded nature of the fund has absorbed the city’s employer share of the normal cost, which 
otherwise would have been approximately $40 million per year according to city budget 
officials.  The city has been contributing approximately $23 million annually to cover the 
employee share of the normal cost as dictated by contracts negotiated with employee unions. 
 
Unfortunately, a significant decrease in pension fund assets resulting from the recent precipitous 
decline in the stock market has dramatically altered the funding status of Milwaukee’s pension 
system, as it has for most public and private systems.  This will create a significant burden on the 
city’s operating budget beginning in 2010, a factor that is discussed in greater detail later in this 
report. 
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Departmental expenditures 
 
Most of the city’s expenditure growth 
from 2004 to 2008 fell within three 
departmental budgets: police, fire, and 
public works – operations (all public 
works expenditures excluding 
administration and infrastructure 
spending).  As shown in Table 15, these 
three departments, which have a 
combined share of 75% of overall tax 
levy-supported departmental expenditures 
(often referred to as operating and 
maintenance expenditures), accounted for 
81% of departmental expenditure growth 
during the period.2   
 
When considering functional 
expenditures as a percentage of all 
General Fund expenditures, as displayed 
in ICMA Indicator 8, the expenditure 
growth for public safety and public works 
appears more modest, but it is important 
to recognize that all other functional areas 
realized slight reductions.  Combined, 
these two analyses demonstrate the extent 
to which three departments obtained the 
vast majority of the limited additional 
dollars available to support city services 
during the period, leaving other functions 
with reduced shares of General Fund 
expenditures.  ICMA suggests that such a 
situation bears watching in light of potential consequences to the level and quality of services 
(also referred to as service solvency) that can be produced by sub-inflationary expenditure 
growth in departmental budgets.      
 
  
                                                 
2One-year discrepancies can – and in this case did – modestly skew expenditure data in ways that impact trends and 
conclusions.  In particular, fire department salaries in 2008 were impacted by retroactive payments based on labor 
settlements, while 2004 salaries were based on 2003 levels because labor negotiations were still ongoing, making 
the overall increase in spending during the period appear somewhat larger than it actually was.  Also, public works 
spending was unusually robust in 2008 because of higher-than-normal snowfall amounts.  Nevertheless, the general 
point that police, fire and public works departments enjoyed the bulk of spending increases during the 2004-08 
period remains accurate. 
 
 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 8 – Expenditures by Major Functions  
 
Why it is Important – This indicator of relative funding by 
function helps explain the causes and impacts of revenue and 
expenditure changes. 
 
ICMA Warning Sign – An increasing proportion of operating 
expenditures by one or two functions. 
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – The public safety and public works 
functions experienced small increases in expenditures as 
compared to overall General Fund expenditures, while most 
other functions experienced small decreases.  This  
trend requires monitoring given the potential  
service impacts to those functions that are  
seeing reduced share of expenditure growth  
and the significant potential for substantial  
reductions in the future in light of the city’s  
overall fiscal challenges. 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee fiscal records 
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Table 15: Police, Fire, and Public Works Expenditure Growth (in thousands)   
 
2004-2008 
difference 
2004-2008 
% change 
Police $35,036 18% 
Fire $16,485 19% 
Public Works – Operations $16,319 20% 
Total expenditure increase for four units $67,840 
Three units as a % of all departmental expenditure increase 81%
Source: City of Milwaukee fiscal reports, 2004-2008 
 
It is important to note that while the city has been able to support additional public works 
expenditures through increases in service fees, support for heightened public safety expenditures 
has come at a cost to other departments.  Those departments include the Department of City 
Development, the Health Department, and the Public Library system.  Of the 120 non-public 
safety, General Fund FTEs eliminated by the city from 2004 to 2008, those three departments 
absorbed 88, or 73% of the reductions, as displayed in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Department of City Development, Department of Health, and  
Public Library FTE Reductions  
Department 
2004-2008 
difference 
2004-2008 
% change 
City Development (42) -20% 
Health (34) -12% 
Public Library (12) -3% 
Total FTE decrease for three units (88) 
Three units as a % of non-public safety General Fund FTE decline 73% 
Source: City of Milwaukee fiscal reports, 2004-2008 
 
The departments cited above have coped with reductions in various ways.  The Department of 
City Development, which lost 42 positions from 2004 to 2008, has attempted to maintain 
services by enhancing relationships with partner agencies outside city government, including the 
Redevelopment Authority of the City of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Economic Development 
Commission.   
 
The Milwaukee Health Department, meanwhile, which lost 34 positions from 2004 to 2008, has 
attempted to become more targeted with its resources, focusing dollars and staff on those areas of 
the city with the poorest health outcomes.  In addition, home visits by nurses, though valued and 
productive, are performed more on an as-needed, as opposed to a proactive basis.     
 
While not losing as many positions (12 during the 2004-08 timeframe), the plight of the Public 
Library system has attracted perhaps the most attention from policymakers and the general 
public.  During the five years under review, the central library and several branch libraries 
operated at reduced hours, and in 2006, the neighborhood bookmobile was eliminated after 
several decades of operation.  These adjustments saved staff time and allowed the Public Library 
system to operate with fewer staff.  In order to mitigate even further staff reductions, the Public 
Library also made reductions in other areas, including a $700,000 reduction in material 
expenditures (books, media, magazines, databases, etc.), which represented a 30% decline in 
material purchases between 2004 and 2008.   
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As noted above, ICMA specifically warns fiscal officials to evaluate whether expanding 
expenditures in one or two departments crowds out the needs of others, thereby reducing service 
solvency to levels that run counter to the needs of citizens and/or the priorities of policymakers.  
In the case of Milwaukee, the areas of police and fire, though not immune from efficiency 
measures, have realized the greatest tax levy-supported expenditure increases during a period in 
which overall expenditure growth was modest.  If continued and/or intensified, this trend 
likely will produce even greater service level impacts to smaller departments in the future, 
calling into question whether they are attaining an appropriate level of service solvency.   
 
Measuring public safety efficiency 
 
It is understandable, of course, that public safety would be the area of government most immune 
from expenditure reductions in light of its “life or death” nature and the value placed on it by 
policymakers and citizens.  However, given that police and fire expenditures comprise 58% of 
the city’s operating and maintenance expenditures, it is worth examining whether Milwaukee’s 
expenditures in the areas of police and fire compare favorably to other large cities.   
 
The most detailed data we found on police and fire personnel and expenditures in other cities is 
an annual survey conducted by ICMA.  Because it is important to consider spending in the 
context of demand, we present this data for police expenditures in Table 17 alongside data 
indicating crime rates as reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  In Table 18, we 
present fire expenditure data from ICMA alongside U.S. Census Bureau data that measures 
potential demand for fire services.  In the absence of uniform data on fire incidences, data 
indicating the median age of structures in the city and annual heating degree days is utilized.  
Each table presents a group of cities that responded to the ICMA survey and that are most 
comparable to Milwaukee in terms of levels of demand.  The data used is for 2008 when 
available and for 2007 when unavailable.   
 
Police 
  
The Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) comprises the greatest portion of city expenditures, 
accounting for 40% of all operating and maintenance expenditures and 38% of all city positions.  
In 2008, the total expenditure budget for the police department was $226.8 million, an increase 
of $35 million (18%) in actual dollars from 2004. This expenditure level supported 2,449 
employees, including 1,944 uniformed officers.  This is an increase of 69 positions during the 
five-year period.       
 
As Table 17 indicates, when compared to other cities with high crime rates, Milwaukee’s 
expenditures per capita and FTE’s were on the high side.  When it comes to the amount of 
money spent per full-time position, Milwaukee ranked more towards the middle.  This 
comparison suggests that when compared to other large cities with similar or greater demands for 
police services, Milwaukee spends more than most per capita, but appears to get more positions 
out of the dollars spent.  This data indicates that, in the face of its fiscal challenges, the city may 
wish to re-examine staffing levels to determine whether they should be more in line with cities 
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like Minneapolis, Toledo or Dallas.  Conversely, in light of significant recent progress in 
reducing crime rates, that may be the last option city officials wish to consider.   
 
The potential need to make difficult decisions with regard to police staffing levels has been 
significantly alleviated by the city’s receipt of $10.3 million in federal stimulus funds to support 
50 police officers during the next three years.  This may obviate the need for deep cuts in police 
staffing levels and/or elimination of new police recruiting classes in 2010, and perhaps for the 
subsequent two years.  However, in light of the size of the police budget and the magnitude of 
the challenges facing the city, those funds are highly unlikely to completely spare MPD from 
reductions and/or pursuit of greater efficiencies.  Also, assuming that the stimulus funds are of a 
“one-time” nature, they may simply delay consideration of considerable reductions in police 
staffing.    
 
Table 17: 2007 and 2008 Crime Rates and City Police Expenditures for Select ICMA 
Survey Respondents, Sorted by Violent Crime Rate 
State City Population 
Violent 
crime rate 
per 
100,000 
residents
Murder 
rate per 
100,000 
residents
Property 
crime 
rate per 
100,000 
residents
FTE per 
1,000 
residents
Uniform 
FTE per 
1,000 
residents 
Per capita 
expenditures
Exps  
per FTE 
MD Baltimore 636,919 1,589 37 4,818 5.64 4.73 $545 $96,543 
PA Philadelphia* 1,448,631 1,475 27 4,305 5.15 4.58 $560 $108,742 
OH Cleveland* 438,013 1,469 20 6,170 4.49 3.66 $391 $87,030 
MN Minneapolis 382,605 1,268 10 5,515 2.84 1.62 $323 $113,929 
OH Toledo* 295,614 1,228 4 6,689 2.74 2.32 $243 $88,520 
WI Milwaukee 604,477 1,219 12 6,072 4.05 3.22 $393 $97,032 
TX Dallas* 1,266,372 1,069 16 6,776 2.87 2.42 $258 $90,034 
FL Jacksonville* 803,514 1,022 15 5,696 3.59 2.05 $355 $98,764 
NM Albuquerque 521,999 894 7 6,049 2.71 1.93 $279 $103,013 
Milwaukee Rank** 5 6 6 4 4 4 3 5 
*Complete 2008 data was unavailable for these cities, however, 2007 data is provided. 
** Ranked in descending order, for example, the city with the highest violent crime rate is ranked number one. 
Source: FBI crime reports for 2007 and 2008; International City/County Management (ICMA) Police and Fire Personnel, 
Salaries, and Expenditures reports for 2007 and 2008; and Milwaukee financial data for 2007 and 2008. 
 
Fire 
 
The Milwaukee Fire Department has the second largest operating expenditure budget in city 
government, accounting for 19% of all operating and maintenance expenditures and 14% of 
positions.  In 2008, the total expenditure budget for the fire department was $105.4 million, an 
increase of $16.5 million (19%) from 2004. This expenditure level supported 929 employees, 
including 850 uniformed personnel.  This is a reduction of 78 positions during the five-year 
period. 
 
As footnoted earlier, an analysis of fire department expenditure data for the period is impacted 
by the fact that fire department salaries in 2004 remained temporarily at 2003 levels due to 
ongoing labor negotiations, whereas 2008 salaries reflected a retroactive pay increase provided 
in 2007.  Consequently, the actual increase in expenditures could be more accurately depicted as 
$10 million, which lags the rate of inflation and which contributed to the loss of positions. 
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Nevertheless, it is still accurate to point out that the fire department received an increase in actual 
funding, while several smaller departments did not.   
 
In Table 18, we compare Milwaukee fire department expenditures with those in other large cities 
with similar demands for fire prevention and control.  Ideally, a city’s demand for fire services 
would be measured by the number of fires within its borders, but uniform data regarding city fire 
rates is not readily available.  An analysis conducted by the National Fire Data Center 
investigated city characteristics that most often are associated with residential fire rates.  This 
study found climate and age of housing stock to be strongly related to fire rates, as cities with 
colder climates and older housing stock have a greater likelihood of fire.  We reflect these 
findings in Table 18 by including cities with similar populations, housing stocks and heating 
degree days.   
 
Table 18: Demand and Fire Expenditure Data for Comparable ICMA Cities, Sorted by 
Age of Housing Stock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Because complete 2008 data was unavailable for these cities, 2007 data is provided. 
** Ranked in descending order, for example, the city with the highest violent crime rate is ranked number one. 
*** Heating degree days are meant to reflect a city’s demand for heat.  Per the U.S. Census 2007 County and City Data Book, 
one heating degree day is accumulated for each whole degree that the mean daily temperature within a city is below 65 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
Source: U.S. Census Fact Finder; U.S. Census County & City Databook, 2007 
 
Table 18 indicates that Milwaukee’s per capita fire department expenditures are comparable to 
the other cities, while its expenditures per fire department position and per uniform position were 
the highest.  While the small sample size makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions, this 
information appears to indicate the reverse of the conclusion drawn for police department 
expenditures, i.e. Milwaukee has high fire department salary and fringe benefit costs that allow 
for fewer personnel with dollars allocated.  Nevertheless, it could be argued that based on per 
capita expenditures, Milwaukee’s fire department costs are not out of line. 
 
The issue of fire department staffing has been debated by city policymakers during the past 
several years and again earlier this year, and it is certain to resurface during 2010 budget 
deliberations.  The mayor has sought to generate personnel savings by reducing the number of 
firefighters on ladder truck crews from five to four, citing national standards that suggest such a 
move would not impact safety or performance.  This proposal has been opposed by the 
firefighters union, which has argued that larger crews are necessary and appropriate from a 
State City Population 
Median 
year 
structure 
built 
Heating 
degree 
days***
FTE per 
1,000 
residents
Uniform 
FTE per 
1,000 
residents 
Per capita 
expenditures 
Exps per 
FTE 
KS Wichita 366,046 1968 4,765 1.18 1.16 $94 $79,280 
NB Omaha 438,646 1963 6,311 1.48 1.46 $173 $116,961
OH Toledo* 295,614 1951 5,464 1.79 1.69 $175 $97,415 
WI Milwaukee 604,477 1948 6,886 1.54 1.42 $186 $120,808
PA Philadelphia* 1,448,631 1947 4,759 1.75 1.68 $187 $106,924
OH Cincinnati * 333,326 1944 4,841 2.60 2.48 $260 $99,967 
MD Baltimore 636,919 1944 4,720 2.72 2.67 $216 $79,585 
MN Minneapolis 382,605 1941 7,876 1.18 1.12 $130 $110,022
OH Cleveland* 438,013 1939 6,121 2.10 2.08 $190 $90,522 
Milwaukee rank** 3 4 2 6 7 5 1 
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safety standpoint in light of Milwaukee’s aging housing stock.  The union also cites a reduction 
of 147 firefighter positions since 2000 as evidence that staffing levels already are stretched thin, 
an argument that appears to be supported by Table 18. 
 
In recent years, the common council has accepted crew reductions on a limited number of ladder 
companies but restored funding for five-member crews on most others.  In the 2009 budget, the 
mayor proposed cutting the crews to four firefighters on each of the nine ladder trucks that had 
not already been cut, but the council accepted the cut in only one of the nine. 
 
This issue exemplifies the dilemma faced by city officials in considering cuts to public safety 
functions.  While the depth of Milwaukee’s budget challenges seemingly would dictate an 
approach that spreads the “pain” across all departmental functions, proposed cuts to public safety 
typically generate the most vociferous response.  Furthermore, because the vast majority of costs 
associated with the police and fire departments are labor-related, significant savings only can be 
generated by reducing positions and/or negotiating reductions in wages and benefits.   
 
The latter approach may be a worthwhile pursuit for the fire department in light of the finding in 
Table 18 that Milwaukee maintains the highest expenditures per FTE among comparable cities.  
Milwaukee’s expenditures are not so dramatically out of line, however, to suggest that sizable 
reductions could be negotiated.  Hence, it is likely that any attempt to wring considerable savings 
out of the fire department budget also will need to involve discussion about continued reductions 
in staffing.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Our analysis of city expenditure trends and application of ICMA indicators reveals that 
Milwaukee maintained conservative expenditure growth from 2004 to 2008, though at a cost of 
requiring other city functions to make do with less so that fire and police functions could receive 
modest increases.  In light of the severe revenue challenges described in the previous section, 
and the projected growth in fringe benefit costs noted in this section, city officials now face an 
extremely difficult dilemma in 2010 and beyond.   
 
An obvious approach would be to attempt to curb spending in the two largest departmental 
budgets, i.e. police and fire.  In fact, a recent briefing by the city budget director noted that 
“based on current cost, revenue, and pension contribution projections it is arithmetically 
impossible to achieve budget balance over the next three years without significant changes to 
these two budgets.”  As our analysis has indicated, while Milwaukee has a relatively high 
number of police personnel and the highest firefighter wages and benefits when compared to 
similar cities, any effort to significantly reduce expenditures in those budgets likely would 
involve staffing cuts.  Because such cuts arguably could diminish recent progress in reducing 
crime rates or impact firefighter safety, citizens may find them objectionable.   
 
Conversely, should policymakers attempt to focus on other areas of the operating budget, they 
would get limited “bang for their buck” and perpetuate a potentially troublesome trend of 
underfunding non-public safety services.  The following sections of this report provide additional 
analysis and context regarding this dilemma and the difficult choices it may require. 
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BUDGETARY SOLVENCY:  CRISIS IN COMPARABLE CITIES 
 
The current recession has profoundly affected the nation’s large cities.   A rapid decline in 
economic activity and real estate values has led to a downturn in municipal revenues from sales, 
income, property, and business-related taxes and from income generated by fees.   Some cities 
also have seen a constriction in their state revenues.  Many cities experienced serious budget 
problems in 2009, and most will find it even more difficult to achieve budget balance in 2010.   
Faced with sizeable deficits, cities are freezing positions, laying off employees, reducing 
expenditure levels, and increasing taxes and fees. Many cities, such as in Cincinnati, are planning 
major budget reductions this year in order to realize a full year of related savings in 2010. 
 
We conducted a general review of the 2009 and 2010 budgets of the 10 cities most frequently 
used in our comparable analyses.  The survey examined the cities’ websites, the websites of local 
newspapers, and other Internet news sources such as business weeklies.  The collected 
information is not complete since some cities have not yet approved their 2010 budgets (although 
budget discussions are in progress).  About half the cities operate under a July 1 fiscal year and 
have already approved their 2010 budgets.   This analysis yielded the following observations:  
 
• No city among the 10 has escaped the recession’s wrath.  Even Oklahoma City, which has 
the lowest unemployment rate (5.7%) of the nation’s large metro areas, will have no pay 
increase for city personnel in 2010. 
 
• While the health of a region’s economy and the state of municipal finance often are 
connected, it is not possible to predict a city’s fiscal condition from environmental factors.  
For example, in recent years, Columbus and Charlotte have had strong economic growth and 
no major problems in local finance.  Under the current recession, both regions have seen a 
sharp rise in unemployment, Columbus to 8.3 % and Charlotte to 12.0%.  Yet, despite their 
upbeat history and now common problems, the cities’ finances are headed in different 
directions. As reported by the city manager, Charlotte “is well positioned to weather the 
recession in 2010.”  Columbus, in contrast, projects a 2010 budget gap of $105 million.  
Another example is the city of Cleveland, which has experienced past economic difficulties 
and which currently has an unemployment rate of about 10%.  Yet, contrary to expectations, 
city officials are optimistic about Cleveland’s 2010 budget prospects.  Because of a carry-
over of $29 million from the previous year, no change in personnel or services is anticipated 
in 2010. 
 
• There is a marked difference in the way cities have strategized 2010 budget development.   
 
o Pittsburgh, which had a budget shortfall in 2009 and expects further revenue declines 
in 2010, will make significant budget cutbacks in the coming year but hopes to do so 
in a way that minimizes long-term consequences.  The city’s “Recession Action Plan” 
reports that “the steep economic decline is estimated to last at least 30 months….we 
have put in place cost reduction strategies that will provide one-time temporary 
budgetary relief.”  Among other measures, the city has implemented a hiring freeze 
and employee furloughs and is seeking to reduce or eliminate discretionary spending 
and non-essential services. 
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o In contrast to Pittsburgh, Sacramento has adopted a 2010 budget that continues a pre-
recession emphasis on the elimination of “structural” budget imbalance and use of 
one-time revenues.  Sacramento also has adopted a multi-year strategy to reduce 
departmental expenditures.3  Similarly, the city of Portland has lowered one-time 
expenditures in an effort to achieve budget “sustainability.”   Consistent with this 
approach, the city decided not to draw down its general fund to finance on-going 
programs.  Rather, Portland has implemented a major review of city services and 
implemented a city-wide expenditure cut of 2.7%.  Portland also increased the size of 
its contingency fund in the face of current uncertainties. 
 
o On August 4, 2009, Columbus city residents approved a referendum to increase the 
city income tax from 2.0% to 2.5%.  The tax increase will take effect on October 1, 
2009.  Under the tax proposal, non-residents who work in the city will also pay an 
additional $50 for each $10,000 they earn, raising their total tax to $250 for each 
$10,000 earned.  The revenue from the proposed tax hike will generate an estimated 
$90 million to $100 million, nearly the amount of the anticipated budget deficit.  If 
the referendum had failed to pass, city officials had said major budget reductions 
would have occurred, such as a 19% cutback in fire department personnel. 
 
• The only new revenue fee uncovered by the research was a “street lighting fee” proposed 
by Minneapolis.  The annual tax would cost the typical homeowner about $20. The 
average commercial property would pay about $50 and some large commercial properties 
could pay as much as $436.  Minneapolis’ loss in state aid of $21 million is the stated 
reason for the tax.  The city will receive $3 million annually from the fee, revenue that 
will make up most of the Department of Public Works’ loss in state aid ($4.6 million). 
 
• None of the cities, as of yet, has proposed selling or leasing their assets as a budget 
strategy.  One reason, perhaps, is that the recent real estate slump has led to a decline in 
the value of city-owned property and a drop off in real estate activity in general.  Several 
cities, however, have concluded asset leases or sales in recent years, including Buffalo, 
Indianapolis, Atlanta, and Chicago.  Chicago has inked three long-term leases for major 
city assets including the Chicago Skyway ($1.8 billion), underground parking lots ($563 
million), and 36,000 city parking spaces ($1.2 billion).   Under these agreements, the city 
has received a large infusion of cash that it has dedicated to current budget deficits, long-
term budget stabilization, and other purposes.   
 
In sum, these cities offer no single or simple path to budget solvency.  The 10 have taken actions 
that reflect their own particular circumstances and needs. Many are making major financial 
changes.  Most are cutting budgets, while a few are raising revenues as well.  
  
                                                 
3 Sacramento adopted its 2010 budget prior to the passage of the California state budget, which uses municipal revenues for state purposes. 
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As they should, many of these cities are focusing on achieving budget balance both in the short 
and long run.  The outcomes can be quite different.  Pittsburgh has not wanted a cyclical 
recession, no matter how severe, to force a lasting change in the government’s scope and 
services.  Sacramento and Portland have not wanted immediate fiscal challenges to divert 
attention from achieving budget sustainability.  All three cities are serving their long-term 
interests, but they have undertaken different actions given their varied goals. 
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LONG­TERM BUDGETARY SOLVENCY 
 
Analyzing long-term budgetary solvency with the ICMA system  
  
The ICMA system is an excellent tool for examining long-term solvency, an inherently complex 
topic.  Central to ICMA’s methodology is the question of whether a government is “currently 
paying the full cost of operating, or is it postponing costs to a future period when revenues may 
not be available to pay these costs.” To address this question, ICMA emphasizes exploring three 
areas that can have a major effect on future spending levels: retirement, long-term borrowing, 
and maintenance of capital assets.  
  
Summary of long-term solvency findings  
 
Despite well-managed debt and retirement programs, in recent years Milwaukee’s long-term 
costs have grown.  Most notably, equity losses in the stock market have produced an unfunded 
liability in the city’s pension fund.  To fully fund the pension system, as required by city 
ordinance, will take an estimated additional $37 million in 2010 and $29 million in 2011.  
Another substantial increase likely will be needed in 2012 and perhaps in the years beyond 
depending upon investment growth.  In addition to these unfunded retirement costs, health care 
and life insurance benefits for retirees also have generated an unfunded liability of $881 million 
(2008 calculation).   
 
Deferred maintenance and the resulting deterioration of city assets also are contributing to long-
term costs.  The most serious problem is the low level of funding for repair and replacement of 
city streets.  An audit conducted by the city comptroller in 2008 found that 21% of local streets 
were in poor condition and that the current maintenance budget was insufficient to halt further 
declines in street quality.  Additional annual support of $17 million to $43 million is required to 
restore all streets to good condition and establish a replacement cycle consistent with the useful 
life of this asset.  Borrowing for this purpose is problematic given the city’s relatively high level 
of levy-supported General Obligation (G.O.) debt.  The city administration has established a 
policy goal of limiting its annual levy-supported G.O. debt service to its current level of about 
$70 million, or roughly one-third of the total property tax levy.  
 
The impact of many of these long-term costs, particularly those related to the pension fund, will 
start to be felt with the 2010 budget.  Major adjustments, such as decreases in department 
expenditures and increases in charges for service revenue, can be anticipated, as can some relief 
from the influx of stimulus funds.  The number of changes and the complexity of the situation do 
not lend themselves to precise budget projections.  Nevertheless, despite changes that will be 
made in the coming year, the relationship between city expenditures and revenues likely will 
remain significantly out of balance in the years to follow.   Long-term fiscal solvency is 
threatened. 
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Analysis 
 
Employee retirement system 
 
An actuarial projection earlier this year estimated that the value of Milwaukee’s pension fund 
assets had decreased by approximately $1.8 billion, producing an unfunded liability of $740 
million.  Consequently, at that time, the city’s pension fund was estimated to have a 90% funding 
ratio based on the actuarial value as of January 1, 2009, and its estimated 2010 employer 
contribution to the pension fund was projected as $92 million (in addition to the approximately 
$23 million employee share the city has been contributing annually for the past several years).   
 
A change in accounting methodology approved by the Annuity and Pension Board in late August 
reduces the city’s 2010 employer share contribution to $37 million.  City budget officials 
preliminarily estimate that could be followed by additional increases of approximately $29 
million in 2011 and $20 million in 2012.  To understand the magnitude of a $37 million increase 
in the ARC payment in one year, consider that if such an increase were the only increase 
contained in the 2010 city budget, then it would cause General Fund operating expenditures to 
increase by 6% over the 2008 total.  Such an increase also would constitute a 22% increase over 
2008 fringe benefit expenditures.  
 
It is worth noting that the city does maintain an ERS Employers’ Reserve Fund, which was 
created to help offset the city’s contribution to the pension fund, particularly if a drop in the 
fund’s value required an unanticipated sharp increase in the contribution.  In the 2009 budget, 
despite the fact that the need for an increased contribution had not yet occurred, the mayor 
proposed a $5.6 million withdrawal from the fund, which at that time contained a balance of 
approximately $25 million.  That proposal, which was approved by the common council, allowed 
the property tax levy share of the city’s normal cost employee contribution to be reduced from 
$23.8 million to $18.2 million.   
 
There will be considerable pressure, therefore, to allocate at least $5.6 million from the fund in 
2010 to avoid an additional property tax levy shortfall, and there likely will be consideration of 
an even larger allocation in light of the sharp increase in the required contribution.  Use of these 
reserves consequently may provide some short-term relief, but once the reserve is exhausted, the 
pension fund obligation likely would worsen.  As we noted in our analysis of the 2009 city 
budget, “this is the type of strategy employed by a governmental entity facing a structural 
imbalance and hoping to buy time to implement solutions.  Whether it is justified or not may 
depend on how serious city policymakers are about addressing the structural problem in the 
immediate future.” 
  
Retiree health care 
 
Another growing threat to the city’s operating budget in the long-term is health care for retirees.  
The city’s health care expenditure budget is comprised of costs associated with both active and 
retired employees.  In 2008, 27% of the city’s health care expenditures, or $28.8 million of the 
$108.1 million total, supported retiree costs. 
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Like many other governments, Milwaukee faces significant unfunded post-retirement liabilities.  
According to the city’s preliminary 2008 financial statements, its other post-employment benefit 
(OPEB) liability is $880.7 million.  This total consists of both health and life insurance liabilities 
for retirees, though the most significant portion is for health insurance.   
 
Unlike Milwaukee County, which in the early 1990s eliminated employer-paid health insurance 
for retirees hired after 1994, the City of Milwaukee provides some level of health insurance 
benefits in accordance with negotiated labor contracts to virtually all retirees who have attained 
at least 15 years of service.  The level of benefit depends on the number of years of service, age 
of retirement and the nature of occupation.  At its most generous level, it includes full health 
insurance coverage for those with 30 years of service who retire at age 55 until they reach age 
65.    
 
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) recently adopted a policy requiring 
government entities to report such OPEB liabilities, but funding those liabilities is not a 
requirement.  The city, like many other government entities, pays OPEB costs on a pay-as-you-
go basis, meaning that it only pays retiree health care costs incurred in a given year and does not 
pay down future liabilities.  In order to support future liabilities, the city would need to 
contribute an estimated $68 million annually, or nearly $40 million more on an annual basis than 
it pays today.  In light of other budget constraints, it is obviously highly unlikely that it will 
identify the resources to do so.  
 
City budget officials recently indicated that health care expenditures are projected to grow by 
$10-$11 million in 2010 and $15-$16 million annually in each of the following two years based 
on current trends, which include anticipated growth in retiree health care costs.  Consequently, 
health care will continue to be a growing burden on the city’s expenditure budget for the 
foreseeable future barring efforts to increase employee/retiree contributions and/or modify 
benefits.  City officials have indicated that substantive changes to employee/retiree health plans 
must be on the table in upcoming labor negotiations.  
 
Long-term borrowing 
 
Milwaukee has a well-managed, large-scale, and multi-purpose debt program.  Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) rates the city’s financial management practices as good, and its debt policies and 
practices contribute to this positive assessment.   The city enjoys outstanding bond ratings from 
all three ratings agencies – S&P, Fitch’s and Moody’s – though Moody’s has changed the city’s 
financial outlook from stable to negative due to “a rapid drawdown of reserves with limited 
revenue raising flexibility; pressured state aid; and weakened pension coverage in the face of 
recession.”   
 
Even with this negative adjustment, Moody’s finds the city’s overall debt “manageable”, while 
Fitch’s labels it “affordable” and S & P “moderate”.  The agencies comment favorably on the 
rapid rate of debt retirement— 83% of outstanding principal amortized within 10 years—and the 
existence of a Public Debt Amortization Fund (PDAF).  Created in 1925, the PDAF is intended 
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to moderate the fluctuations in debt service payments and serves as a partial debt service reserve.  
At the end of 2008, the PDAF had $60 million in assets.  Under fund restrictions, the city may 
not draw more than 40% of the PDAF balance in any one year.  The fund must maintain a 
minimum balance of $2 million. 
 
Such borrowing and reserve practices reap benefits to all city residents.  A study conducted by 
the comptroller’s office in 2007 found that Milwaukee’s per capita interest costs for debt service 
were 40% below the average of comparable cities.   These reduced costs result from lower 
borrowing charges and accelerated repayment rates, however, as opposed to lower levels of debt.  
In fact, total borrowing is above the average of similar cities. 
 
The city’s debt program serves multiple purposes.    Milwaukee borrows to meet the capital 
needs of its major programs and to maintain city assets and infrastructure, such as buildings, 
streets and bridges.  Milwaukee also borrows to fund the capital costs of its business 
enterprises—water, sewer, and parking—and to pay capital improvement costs incurred by tax 
incremental districts (TIDs).  Milwaukee also engages in short-term borrowing to make up for 
cash flow fluctuations.  Finally, the city issues debt on behalf of Milwaukee Public Schools.  
 
At the end of 2008, the city had outstanding debt of $881 million.  Of this total, debt backed by 
G.O. bonds amounted to $761 million, which is 13% higher than in 2004.  Revenue bonds 
amounted to $61 million and had declined by 19%.  About 60% of this total debt was incurred, in 
roughly equal proportions, for three purposes: TIDs, city buildings, and schools.  About 20% 
financed streets and sewers.   The remaining 20% went to 10 or so other purposes such as water, 
parking, bridges, and libraries.  
 
Table 19: Milwaukee Tax Levy Debt Service Payments, 2004 to 2008  
(in thousands) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
5-yr 
difference 
5-yr
% change 
$53,995  $84,699  $58,725  $67,422  $74,201  $20,206  37.4% 
Source: Comprehensive annual financial reports, 2004 to 2008 
 
As Table 19 indicates, from 2004 to 2008, debt service payments funded through the tax levy 
increased by $20 million, or 37% (compared with a 14% growth in inflation).  This growth in 
levy-funded debt costs has been a source of concern to the city.  While recognizing the 
importance of maintaining infrastructure and capital assets, the 2009-2014 capital improvement 
plan also stresses the need to moderate “growth in the tax levy supported capital budget…by 
pursuing alternatives for financing capital needs.”   The plan establishes five capital financing 
strategies to achieve this goal: 
 
 Limit new borrowing in a given year to an amount equal to the amount of debt retired 
in that year 
 
 Borrow only for MPS’s self-supporting debt (a policy in place since 2008) 
 
 Focus on repair and refurbishment, not capital expansion, and prioritize among capital 
projects 
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 Improve project management to ensure capital projects are completed on time and 
within budget and, thereby, avoid additional construction costs 
 
 Diversify capital funding by using alternative sources such as water and sewer fees.  
Also, use leases to fund capital costs in the city’s business enterprises and continue to 
rely upon the wheel tax. 
 
Debt service expenditures were reduced in the 2009 budget to $70.6 million. 
 
ICMA evaluates long-term debt by evaluating whether overall borrowing endangers future 
ability to repay, and the impact of debt service payments upon current budgets.  Under its 
standard, a local government’s debt “is proportional in size and rate of growth to its tax base; 
does not extend past the useful life of the facilities that it finances; is not used to balance the 
operating budget; does not require repayment schedules that put excessive burdens on operating 
expenditures; and is not so high as to jeopardize the government’s credit rating.”  
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A common measure of 
long-term debt is its 
relationship to 
equalized value.  
Under state statutes, 
Milwaukee’s debt 
cannot exceed 7% of 
equalized value.  In 
2007, Milwaukee’s 
debt equaled 32% of 
the state limit.  In 
other words, 
Milwaukee could have 
assumed a twofold 
debt increase and 
remained under the 
state threshold.   On 
another measure, 
overall net debt as a 
percentage of 
equalized value, 
Milwaukee also is 
substantially below the 
rating agencies’ 
warning threshold, as 
shown in ICMA 
Indicator 9. 
 
A few words of 
caution about debt standards.  It is a positive sign that the rating agencies find Milwaukee to have 
manageable debt.  Such evaluations are synonymous with a good credit rating and lead to lower 
interest costs.  However, in looking at professional debt standards, one should keep in mind that 
these are general criteria applied across a vast range of circumstances. Consideration of whether 
a particular city’s level of debt is appropriate should reflect its specific fiscal condition, and not 
simply whether it falls within a general guideline.   
 
As has been shown, Milwaukee’s financial capacity and demands for service place it in a more 
difficult budget position than similar cities.  Moreover, since Milwaukee depends heavily upon 
property taxes and to a greater extent than other cities, capacity to pay for debt, as measured in 
Indicator 9, should not be confused with willingness to pay.  Finally, since Milwaukee repays its 
debt more quickly than other cities, its debt service payments are higher for an equivalent 
amount of loan debt.   These factors, coupled with the city’s new policy to halt growth in tax-
levy borrowing, are signs that the city’s debt load is close to putting “excessive demands upon 
operating expenditures,” something ICMA warns against. 
 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 9 – Long‐term Debt 
  
Why it is Important – Net direct debt is bonded debt for which the local government has 
pledged its good faith and credit and which is supported by tax revenues.  Overall net 
direct debt includes city debt plus all bonded debt issued by other governmental units in 
the city, such as MPS.  It also includes city residents’ relative proportion of debt for 
Milwaukee County, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, and the Milwaukee 
Area Technical College district.  Credit agencies routinely examine a local government’s 
debt load in setting a bond rating.  Increasing debt is one possible indication of a 
deteriorating fiscal condition.  Conversely, low debt may indicate an underinvestment in 
capital facilities. 
 
ICMA Warning Signs 
 Increasing net bonded debt as a percentage of assessed valuation. 
 Overall net debt exceeding 10% of assessed valuation.  
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – In 2008, Milwaukee’s net direct debt  
represented 2.4% of equalized value, a decrease from the 3.1% in 2004.   
Overall direct debt issued by all governmental units represented 4.6% of  
equalized value, substantially below the warning threshold.  While this is  
a positive indicator of fiscal health, the impact of debt service payments 
on the city’s operating budget (as described in the report) makes this an  
indicator that requires monitoring. 
 
Year 
Equalized 
value* 
Net direct 
debt** 
% of 
equalized 
value 
Overall net 
direct debt** 
% of 
equalized 
value 
2004 $20,298  $629,124  3.1% $1,195,674  5.9% 
2005 $21,730  $666,203  3.1% $1,253,265  5.8% 
2006 $23,491  $755,178  3.2% $1,358,386  5.8% 
2007 $26,256  $671,562  2.6% $1,289,210  5.8% 
2008 $30,226  $713,783 2.4% $1,388,576  4.6% 
Source: CAFR, 2004 to 2008 
* in millions 
** in thousands 
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Milwaukee has conceived thoughtful policies to maintain its capital assets and curtail growth in 
levy-supported debt.  However, it is an open question as to whether these polices can accomplish 
the city’s goals.  There is good reason for the city not to increase levy-supported debt, since 
financing such costs may need to come, at least in part, from internal reallocations at the expense 
of public safety.  On the other hand, as the next section shows, capital assets, particularly local 
streets, are not in good condition and their repair and restoration will require a substantial 
investment.  Can the city find other strategies to address its basic capital needs?  If not, 
Milwaukee may find itself in the sad state of choosing between police or potholes.  
   
Maintenance of capital assets  
  
A local government’s wealth is rooted in the value of its capital assets, i.e. its streets, buildings, 
land, utilities, vehicles, networks, and equipment.  Appropriately maintaining these assets 
requires a continuous long-term commitment.  Yet, as ICMA has observed, many governments 
have not been willing to fully fund such costs and have discovered that underfunding capital 
assets is “a relatively painless way to temporarily reduce expenditures and ease financial strain.”  
The ultimate consequence of sustained inattention can be severe and include “1) decreasing 
usefulness of the asset; 2) increasing cost of maintaining and replacing them; and 3) decreasing 
attractiveness of the community as a place to live or do business.”    
   
A six-year capital plan, reviewed annually as part of the budget process, guides Milwaukee’s 
capital investments.  The plan establishes the objectives, processes, and management rules and 
practices that affect capital decisions and project oversight.  In addition to the capital plan, the 
Department of Public Works uses an Oracle database to assist in project development and 
implementation.  Nevertheless, despite these management strengths, the city’s ability to properly 
maintain its capital assets is hampered by the lack of a comprehensive assessment of their 
condition.   
 
In order to evaluate the condition of the city’s capital assets, we consulted two recent city 
studies: its Facility Condition Information System (FCIS) report, and an audit of the residential 
streets paving program.  The city began the FCIS in 1995 and last conducted this analysis in 
2006.   Milwaukee routinely uses the latest FCIS assessment to prioritize capital projects and 
funding requests.  The 2006 evaluation examined 111 sites and facilities that are under the direct 
responsibility of the Department of Public Works and represent about one third the value of all 
city assets.  The evaluation examined all aspects of these facilities including their physical 
structure and interior systems, such as heating and plumbing.  Not included in the capital 
assessment were 60 or more facilities operated by the library, Port of Milwaukee, water works, 
and fire, health, and police departments.  The city has not conducted a condition assessment of 
those assets. 
 
The FCIS evaluates the condition of DPW-managed assets by comparing their deferred 
maintenance needs with the facilities’ current replacement value, a common industry standard.  
When deferred maintenance costs exceed 11% of replacement value, the assets are found to be in 
poor condition.   
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Under the 2006 FCIS application, DPW’s deferred maintenance needs amounted to $82 million, 
or 25% of the asset replacement value of $321 million.   Deferred maintenance costs associated 
with the City Hall exterior renovation—earmarked but not expended at the time of the study – 
were not included in this assessment.  The report concluded that the poor condition of DPW’s 
assets was due to a decline in city maintenance funding, which was seen as an ominous sign 
given the ongoing rise in construction costs. It recommended that maintenance funding would 
“need to be substantially increased to keep pace with the construction costing trend across the 
nation.”  In the 2009 budget, repair and maintenance funding of DPW assets remains at $5.6 
million, the same level as at the time of the FCIS study.           
 
The audit of residential streets reviewed the condition, funding, and management of these assets.  
The City of Milwaukee has 1,145 miles of roads, of which less than 10%, or 122 miles, are the 
responsibility of another entity (primarily highways and freeways that are under the control of 
the state and federal governments).   The audit concluded that, overall, local streets were in “fair 
condition and getting worse.”  A total of 212 miles, or 21% of all city roads, were in “poor” 
condition and in need of restoration, while 44% were in “fair” and 35% in “good” shape. 
 
The audit attributed the cause of asset deterioration to “nearly two decades of underfunding”.   
Monies budgeted to local street repair had been cut in half in 1993 and had not been restored.  As 
a result, the streets were on a 106-year replacement cycle, or two to three times the length of 
their “useful life”.   
 
Perhaps understandably, in light of the lengthy replacement cycle, the audit notes that DPW had 
focused on paving the streets in poorest condition.  However, this policy has left little money 
available for preservation, which is deemed a more economical way to maintain these assets.  In 
the end, the audit projects that the current paving policy and the level of funding would result in 
further street deterioration. The report recommended that Public Works shift towards 
preservation to optimize available funding.  However, this approach also would create a 
“backlog” of streets in poor condition whose upkeep would depend upon periodic patching and 
development of a dedicated funding plan.  Under the city’s existing funding and paving strategy, 
the audit estimated that half of local streets would be in poor condition within 25 years. 
 
In regard to program costs, the audit concluded that “the funding required to address the present 
backlog and ongoing residential street replacement is staggering” and, by necessity, would 
require a long-term commitment and funding plan.  Given the fiscal challenge presented, the 
report put forward multiple funding scenarios. Under the current paving strategy, it concluded 
that current annual funding of $8.8 million would need to increase by $33 to $42.8 million “in 
order to both eliminate the present backlog and improve the entire network of residential streets 
to good condition.”  In contrast, a preservation first strategy could restore 95% of local streets to 
good condition by adding $16.9 million a year, still a substantial sum. Another option would 
increase the annual budget by $6.6 million a year and restore 75% of streets to good condition, 
but that option would not address the sizeable backlog of streets in poor condition.  
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ICMA Indicator 10 shows trends in 
capital outlay expenditures, as well as 
repair and maintenance expenditures for 
Department of Public Works facilities.  
Those expenditures constitute about one 
third of all city assets and provide the best 
available information for this indicator.  
The city’s capital outlay and repair and 
maintenance expenditures reveal no clear 
trend.  The Public Works expenditures do 
not include any funds associated with the 
City Hall exterior restoration ($70 million 
total cost) or with Menominee Valley 
facility relocation ($24 million total cost).  
Repair and maintenance funding in 2007 
was unusually low because of the sizeable 
costs incurred in that year for the City Hall 
restoration.  
     
Long-term budget prospects 
 
The years reviewed for this ICMA 
analysis, 2004 to 2008, were characterized 
by modest change.  There was one major 
cost driver for the operating budget (health 
care benefits) and three secondary revenue 
sources (charges for services, enterprise 
transfers, and the TSF) that increased 
above the rate of inflation.  Overall, 
expenditures and revenues approached but 
did not reach the level of inflation.   
 
In 2010, things will change.  Driven by recessionary influences, revenues and expenditures will 
depart from past experience and the city will need to undertake new initiatives and exceptional 
actions to maintain budget balance.  Uncertainty about the economic recovery and those actions 
complicates budget projections.  However, two broad conclusions seem appropriate.  First, city 
hall’s fiscal actions in 2010 will have long-term implications.  Second, no action or combination 
of actions taken in the coming year is likely to eliminate the structural imbalance that exists 
between revenues and expenditures.   
 
The key challenge in 2010 will be the need to significantly increase property tax levy support for 
the city’s pension fund.  As explained in this report, a contribution of $37 million will be 
required in 2010.  On top of this exceptional increase, the city’s budget office projects that wages 
will rise by about $15 million and health care by another $10-$11 million.  Other non-salary 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 10 – Capital Improvements and 
Repair and Maintenance 
 
Why it is important? – Capital improvements and repair 
and maintenance expenditures provide an indication of 
whether capital needs are being addressed. 
 
ICMA Warning Sign – A three year or more decline in 
capital improvement and maintenance expenditures. 
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – Repair and maintenance 
expenditures, as explained in the text, are for Department 
of Public Works facilities. Neither capital outlay 
expenditures nor repair and maintenance  
expenditures present a definite expenditure  
trend. Also, neither indicator displays the  
kind of changes that would warrant an  
ICMA warning.  Lack of funding growth,    
however, suggests these trends require  
monitoring in the future.   
 
 
Source:  Milwaukee Financial Records, 2004 to 2008 
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costs normally grow by about $2 million annually and, in addition, a jump of $1.5 million is 
expected in workman’s compensation.  In total, the budget office projects that a cost-to-continue 
budget would require $75 to $80 million in additional revenue, or roughly $55 to $60 million 
beyond the rate of inflation (assuming a 3% rate of growth). 
 
City revenues from 2004 to 2008 increased by $15 million a year, just a fraction of the amount 
needed to fund a cost-to-continue budget in 2010.   Moreover, the recession’s lower levels of 
economic activity should continue to produce a decline in licenses and permits, charges for 
services, fines and forfeitures, and miscellaneous revenue.  The city projects income from these 
sources to decrease by a total of $4.9 million in 2010.  Intergovernmental revenue also will fall 
since the state of Wisconsin has lowered aid to Milwaukee by $2.6 million and upped fees for 
garbage disposal by another $2.0 million as part of the 2009-11 biennial budget.  In addition, the 
city’s draw from the Tax Stabilization Fund is anticipated to be about $15 million less than in 
2008.  
 
The only bright spot in this ominous fiscal cloud are the monies to be received under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).  It is not possible to estimate ARRA’s 
impact at this time.  Certainly, the program will help city finances, but it does not represent an 
answer to its problems.  For one thing, many stimulus grants are given for purposes unrelated to 
the maintenance of existing city services.  Also, many of these grants will go towards capital and 
not operating purposes, though funds for infrastructure improvements may enable the city to 
lower future debt service costs.  Finally, since ARRA is intended as a fiscal stimulus, grants are 
for a short period of time. For operations-related grants, the city either will have to discontinue 
the program or find other revenues for it once the grant has expired.   
 
In April 2009, Milwaukee announced that it had been awarded $4.5 million for Community 
Development Block Grants under ARRA.  Of these monies, $1.1 million will go to the 
Department of Public Works for its street improvement program.  Other funds will go toward 
diverse purposes such as housing, urban forestry, graffiti mitigation, and a streetscape project.  
More recently, the city also received $10.3 million in stimulus funds to support 50 police officers 
for three years. While the grant does not require matching funds, the city must pay these officers’ 
salaries for a fourth year.   
 
Many ARRA funds have yet to be awarded and the federal government will continue to 
announce grants at least through the fall of 2009.  The city has submitted proposals to purchase 
equipment to enhance lakefront security, buy and upgrade foreclosed property, extend internet 
access at six public libraries and three public housing projects, upgrade the police department’s 
statistical capability, enhance and expand new crime prevention programs, and provide 
infrastructure improvements for city sewers, bridges, and transit.  
 
No matter the outcome of these grant proposals, any money received will only make a small dent 
in Milwaukee’s operating budget.  As a consequence, city hall will need to enact major 
expenditure reductions, revenue increases, or likely some combination of both in order to 
balance its budget in 2010 and beyond.  State aid, as described in this report, should not be 
expected to increase, which places considerable pressure on other resources to provide revenue 
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growth.  For the city’s second largest revenue source, the property tax, a 1% increase in revenue 
would generate about $1.6 million for additional operating support.  A 3% increase in levy 
proceeds, then, would produce about $5 million in additional operating budget revenue.   
 
Given the above, it is easy to understand why the mayor and his budget team already have 
focused on extending major charges for services revenues to cover the full cost of their 
operations.  This change could yield as much as $10 million in 2010.  Another possible initiative 
would involve increasing the amount of monies transferred from enterprise operations, such as 
the Water Works, to the General Fund. 
 
However, because the kind of revenue changes discussed above cannot begin to provide the 
resources needed to balance the 2010 budget, the city also will need to enact major expenditure 
reductions.  The budget office currently is talking about lowering expenditures by as much as 
10% in 2010.  In terms of long-term solvency, a key issue is whether these reductions will 
moderate major cost drivers.  If so, the city will begin to address its structural problems.  If not, 
they will shrink the overall level of government to achieve budget balance in one year—with all 
the attending service cutbacks that entails—but will not avert the need to make similar 
contractions in the future.  Further complicating this issue is the fact that major change is not 
easy and requires extensive internal analysis and administrative review, as well as broad 
consultation with city employees (including labor contract negotiations), program recipients, and 
the public at large. 
 
Looking beyond 2010 to future budgets, the four major cost drivers discussed above will 
continue to push city expenditures beyond the rate of inflation for at least the next two years, 
threatening budget solvency.  The post-2010 impacts of these items are briefly summarized 
below. 
 
 Health care—Milwaukee’s health care costs show no sign of slowing down, with 
increases of $15 to $16 million projected for 2011 and 2012.  Costs have been driven not 
only by the rise in medical prices, but also by the rate of utilization of medical services 
and the level of benefits provided, especially to retirees.  While the nation seems poised 
to adopt changes in the overall health care system, prudence suggests that four decades of 
escalating costs will not be easily halted and that any cost control measures adopted may 
take years to achieve their full effect. 
 
 Pension—Prior to the change in accounting assumptions approved by the Pension Board 
in August, pension contributions were projected to continue to grow by a minimum of 
$18 million in 2011 and $13 million in 2012.  According to city budget officials, 
preliminary estimates indicate the new assumptions, while reducing the additional 2010 
contribution from $49 million to $37 million, would require an additional $29 million in 
2011 and an additional $20 million in 2012.  To put this into context, Milwaukee’s 
operating expenditures, in total, grew by $15 million a year from 2004 to 2008.   While a 
rise in the stock market will restore some equity value to the pension fund, the amount 
and rate of any rise is difficult to predict.  Maintaining costs at a reasonable level over the 
long-term, therefore, may necessitate a change in pension benefits, which are higher than 
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state pension benefits in a number of employee categories.   Of course, any such change 
must be negotiated with employee unions and likely would take years to have a 
significant fiscal effect. 
 
 Salaries and Wages—City budget officials have estimated that funding salaries and 
wages on a cost-to-continue basis will require an estimated $15 million on an annual 
basis barring a significant reduction in personnel and/or advantageous labor agreements 
negotiated with employee unions.    
 
 Capital Maintenance and Replacement—As noted above, the city eventually will need to 
budget additional funds for the maintenance and replacement of the city’s capital assets, 
especially local streets, in order to avoid further deterioration in their condition.  These 
costs are substantial and will only continue to grow if funding remains inadequate.  A 
recent study estimated that restoring 95% of local streets to good condition would require 
an additional $16.9 million a year, even if the city were to adopt a repair and replacement 
strategy that optimized costs. 
 
In sum, the city will be severely challenged for the next several years to bring its 
expenditure increases within the rate of inflation without seriously harming its program 
and service capabilities.  Yet, even inflationary growth in revenues – the ICMA standard – 
is unlikely to be attained.    
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CASH SOLVENCY 
 
Analyzing cash solvency with the ICMA system  
  
Cash solvency refers to the ability of a government 
to pay its bills.  Two ICMA measures for cash 
solvency pertain to liquidity and General Fund 
balance.  Liquidity examines the flow of money in 
and out of the treasury.  If revenues are on hand to 
cover expenditures, a government has positive 
liquidity or cash flow.  If such revenues are lacking, 
the government must borrow to pay its bills.  A 
positive fund balance provides an indication of a 
government’s ability to maintain cash solvency, as 
well as meet unanticipated emergencies.  
  
Summary of findings on cash solvency  
 
Milwaukee maintains a reasonable cash balance, 
liquidity levels that conform with ICMA standards, 
and several reserve funds (Tax Stabilization Fund, 
Public Debt Amortization Fund, ERS Employers’ 
Reserve Fund and contingency fund) to respond to 
revenue and fiscal challenges.  In 2008, however, 
the city’s withdrawal of revenues from the TSF and 
PDAF resulted in balances that were below 
previous levels.  These actions also reduced the 
General Fund balance and liquidity.  Such actions, 
if continued in the future, would be a cause for 
concern.        
  
Analysis   
 
Milwaukee’s cash solvency rests upon a three-line level of defense: its cash liquidity, General 
Fund balance, and reserve funds.  As ICMA Indicator 11 shows, Milwaukee has a liquidity 
ratio well within ICMA standards, although the relationship between cash/investments and 
current liabilities declined between 2004 (a ratio of $119 million to $50 million) and 2008 ($75 
million to $61 million).   
 
In 2007, the city’s General Fund balance of $73 million represented 12% of its operating 
revenues, a fall-off from $105 million in 2006, the high point of the trend, as shown in ICMA 
Indicator 12.  As a percentage of operating revenues, Milwaukee’s cash balance is lower than 
most comparable cities.  Table 20 demonstrates that Sacramento (36%) and Charlotte (32%) are 
in the best position, while Cleveland (6%) and Toledo (5%) are in the worst. 
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 11 – Liquidity 
   
Why it is Important – A key measure of a city’s 
short‐term fiscal condition is its liquidity.  ICMA 
defines liquidity as the ratio of cash and short‐term 
investments to current liabilities.  Assessing liquidity 
is complicated by the flow of payments in and out 
of government coffers in the course of the year.  For 
this reason, evaluation of liquidity should take place 
at the same point in time, as we do here. 
    
ICMA Warning Sign 
• A decreasing amount of cash and short‐term 
investment as a percentage of current 
liabilities 
• Three or more years of a ratio of greater than 1 
to 1.   
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – Over the past few 
years, Milwaukee’s liquidity ratio has worsened 
slightly.  However, levels of cash and  
investments still exceed current  
liabilities and the city meets ICMA’s  
liquidity ratio. As a result, this a  
positive indicator of fiscal health,  
yet one that still will require  
monitoring given the city’s fiscal  
challenges.      
 
Year  Ratio  
2004 1 to 0.4 
2005 1 to 0.5 
2006 1 to 0.4 
2007 1 to 0.8 
2008 1 to 0.8 
Source: City of Milwaukee, CAFR, 2004 to 2008
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Unlike some other local units of 
government, the City of Milwaukee has 
had the foresight to establish reserve funds 
to prepare for downturns in the economy 
and changes in the city’s fiscal condition.  
The Tax Stabilization Fund, the Public 
Debt Amortization Fund, the ERS fund 
and budget contingency fund are described 
elsewhere in this report. Taken together, 
the reserve funds buttress cash solvency. 
 
In 2008, the city drew upon the TSF and 
PDAF more than in previous years.  At the 
close of 2008, the TSF balance was $42.4 
million, or two-thirds the average closing 
balance from 2004 to 2008.  The PDAF 
balance was at $59.9 million, or 83% its 
average closing balance.   Depending upon 
one’s point of view, the city’s increased 
reliance upon these reserves at a time of 
fiscal difficulty can be seen as a sign of 
good sense or as a harbinger of future 
difficulties.  Moody’s cited the “rapid 
drawdown in reserves” in revising the 
city’s fiscal outlook from stable to 
negative.  On the other hand, Standard and 
Poor’s found that the remaining TSF 
assets were at a “good” level.   Obviously, 
the larger fund withdrawals in 2008 mean 
that Milwaukee will have fewer resources upon which to rely in the future.  The city should 
continue to monitor the use and level of these funds.  
 
Table 20: General Fund Balance as Percent of Operating Expenditures, 2007  
(in thousands) 
City Percentage 
Charlotte 32.3% 
Cincinnati 20.8% 
Cleveland 6.4% 
Columbus 17.5% 
Milwaukee 15.1% 
Minneapolis 18.7% 
Oklahoma City 27.5% 
Pittsburgh 19.8% 
Portland 19.8% 
Sacramento 35.7% 
Toledo 5.2% 
Milwaukee rank* 9 
* Ranked in descending order; for example, city with highest % of General Fund balance ranks 1st.  
Source:  City CAFRs, 2007  
ICMA Fiscal Indicator 12 – Fund Balance 
 
Why it is Important – Fund balances are a form of financial 
reserve that affect a government’s ability to meet 
unanticipated costs and emergencies. 
 
ICMA Warning Sign – Declining General Fund balance as a 
percent of net operating revenues. 
 
City of Milwaukee Finding – In 2008, Milwaukee had a $73 
million ending fund balance, which represented 11.9% of its 
operating revenues. The city’s balance had  
declined by $18 million from a level of $91  
million in 2007, and a downward trend is  
observable over this period. Given these  
changes and the city’s other fiscal  
challenges, this is an indicator that  
requires monitoring.  
 
 
Source: City of Milwaukee, CAFR, 2004 to 2008 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This report has used the Fiscal Trend Monitoring System of the International City/County 
Management Association to evaluate the fiscal health of the City of Milwaukee government.  
The system examines key fiscal characteristics and follows trends in various indicators to 
determine a government’s financial condition.  Major findings from our analysis are as follows:   
 
 Milwaukee shows deterioration in all four ICMA categories of fiscal solvency.   In budget 
solvency, Milwaukee’s operating expenditures have grown faster than revenues, as major 
revenues have languished while expenditures have become harder to control; in cash 
solvency, the General Fund balance and the level of reserve funds declined as did liquidity; 
in long-run solvency, unfunded retirement obligations climbed and the condition of city 
assets, especially local streets, worsened due to insufficient funding; and in service solvency, 
most city departments’ budgets have not kept pace with inflation, necessitating position 
reductions that have impacted the level and scope of services delivered.   
 
 Milwaukee’s revenue structure presents tremendous and increasingly difficult fiscal 
challenges for the city.  ICMA states that under a condition of fiscal health, a municipality 
should have diverse revenue sources, many of which are under its direct control and which 
rise with the level of inflation.  In contrast, Milwaukee has fewer revenue sources than 
similar cities.  State aid, the city’s largest revenue source, has not increased in 12 years.  
Unlike most cities, Milwaukee depends upon a single local tax to fund its operating 
expenditures.   As a result, property taxes are higher in Milwaukee, even though the city 
generates less revenue from local taxation than other cities.   
 
 In recent years, Milwaukee has been able to maintain expenditure growth, albeit not at the 
rate of inflation, by drawing down revenues from the Tax Stabilization Fund, increasing 
transfers from enterprise funds, and (especially) by raising charges for service revenue.   This 
fiscal strategy does not have long-term viability.  There are not sufficient reserves to continue 
past rates of utilization and charges for services are limited by statute to no more than cost, a 
level they are rapidly approaching. 
 
 There is no reason to be hopeful about the prospects of even modest increases in state aid.  
The shared revenue program is frozen in place.  The state has eliminated not only new 
funding, but also the very policies and formulae that normally would serve as a mechanism 
by which to reassess and adjust annual levels of support and aid distribution.  State priorities 
lay elsewhere – in school aid, medical assistance, and corrections – programs that have 
grown rapidly during the past decade.  Even a change in priorities, however unlikely, would 
not produce significant state revenue increases since the recession has brought a fall-off in 
state tax revenues.  State government finances will remain troubled for the next few years, at 
a minimum. 
 
 ICMA encourages analysis of expenditure patterns and the factors driving expenditure 
growth.  In the case of Milwaukee, the results are hardly encouraging.  The city has 
experienced a strong increase in fringe benefit expenditures, the type of costs that are 
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difficult to control.  Health care costs grew by $26 million (31%) from 2004 to 2008, 
accounting for 38% of the $68 million in total expenditure growth, and they are expected to 
continue to grow by an average of $13 million annually in the next three years.  In addition, 
the precipitous fall in the stock market has created an unfunded liability in the city’s 
retirement fund, necessitating an allocation of an additional $37 million in 2010 and 
additional increases in future years.  Additional retirement costs should total at least $66 
million in the next two years, an amount nearly equal to the overall growth in operating 
expenditures from 2004 to 2008.  While city officials have limited options for cutting 
retirement benefit costs for existing retirees and employees without their consent, these 
factors suggest that significant prospective changes to the city’s fringe benefit structure must 
be contemplated as part of a larger strategy to attain long-term solvency.    
 
 Another key source of expenditure pressure is capital debt, as debt service payments funded 
through the tax levy increased by $20 million, or 37%, from 2004 to 2008 (before declining 
by $4 million in 2009).  Reducing this burden is no easy task given that capital assets, 
particularly local streets, are not in good condition and their repair and restoration will 
require a substantial investment.  Also, the city’s prudent and conservative debt repayment 
policies make it difficult to reduce debt service payments (while appropriately investing in 
infrastructure) since the city's G.O. debt is paid off over a shorter period of time and at a 
higher annual level than comparable cities. 
 
 By increasing program revenues and prioritizing annual funding increments, the city has 
maintained police and public works operations at a rate greater than inflation.  Most 
departments, however, have not seen such funding increases.  A few departments – city 
development, health, and public libraries – accounted for 73% of the loss in non-public safety 
positions (88 of the total 120 positions).       
 
 Since public safety constitutes more than one-half of all city operating expenditures, our 
analysis compared police and fire data with data from similar cities.  The results show that 
Milwaukee spends more per capita on police than most and more on firefighter salaries and 
benefits than all.  In light of the city’s overall budget challenges, those findings could prompt 
policymakers to re-examine police staffing levels and firefighter compensation.  However, 
any attempts to do so may contradict the high priority placed on public safety by constituents 
as well as recent progress in reducing crime rates. 
 
 The City of Milwaukee is well run and management is not the cause of its fiscal problems.  
Policies and practices for general obligation debt load and rate of amortization meet or 
exceed professional standards.  Multiple reserve accounts buttress budget and long-term 
solvency.   Enterprise operations do not draw upon tax revenues but rather contribute surplus 
funds to the city’s operating budget.  
 
 The recession has aggravated, not caused, the city’s fiscal problems.  Even before the 
recession occurred, Milwaukee was on a downward financial path.  Major revenues could not 
keep pace with inflation.  Fringe benefit costs rose significantly forcing budget reductions 
(when adjusted by inflation) in some departments, and internal cutbacks in non-fringe benefit 
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costs.  In its weakened state, the city was vulnerable to the loss of revenue and asset value 
that has accompanied the recession.  Major cutbacks in program operations and budgets will 
be necessary in 2010. 
 
 Without major changes, Milwaukee’s fiscal condition will become more severe and fiscal 
pressures will escalate.  Fringe benefits are climbing and are difficult to control.  The 
condition of city assets, particularly local streets, is deteriorating and will require additional 
funding.   Maintaining expenditures at the level of inflation will be difficult to achieve.  Yet, 
there is little likelihood that incoming revenue will even reach this level.   Major cutbacks in 
service and a loss in service solvency are a looming prospect.  
 
The purpose of this report has been to provide information and analysis to establish a platform 
for subsequent policy discussion and action.  It is hoped that whatever action the city decides 
upon will be of the size and scope needed to address its fiscal challenges.   
 
Milwaukee has serious, deep-seated fiscal problems.  Its revenue structure is broken and 
expenditures exceed levels of sustainability.  Given the difficulties, getting by seems like an 
achievement.  Yet, incremental change is unlikely to overcome the ongoing debilitation.   
 
Can Milwaukee overcome institutional obstacles and lack of support from state government to 
consider the kind of fundamental fiscal change that is truly needed?  In order to do so, city hall 
must be able to engage the residents, organizations, and businesses in the city (and indeed, the 
region and state) to think deeply about its problems, and to join it in setting forth a course of 
action in which short term budget fixes and long-term goals are compatible and systemic in 
nature. 
 
 
